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The Effectiveness of Judicial Activism:
Desegregation and Racial Attitudes
by
Steven E. Hugie

The relationship between Supreme Coun desegregation rulings and the racial tolerance
of Americans is examined. Comprehensive summaries are given of the desegregation cases and
public opinion survey data on the question of public school desegregation from 1954 to present.
While some question the constitutionality of judicial activism, it is defended on the gounds tht
it is an effective means for achieving imponant social ends. Data show that when (from the 1954
Brown decision to the 1974 Milliken decision) the Coun pressed for desegregation, the public
responded more positively to opinion poll questions about the appropriateness ofracially balanced
schools. Milliken represented a turning point fro the Coun. Since the coun began weakening
its demands for integration, public opinion has been much less favorable on racial integration.
The legitimation hypothesis is defended, placing the responsibility for deteriorating racial attitudes
on a Coun which could, but is unwilling to, change those attitudes. Alternative explanations,
which would attribute the decline in racial attitudes to the failures ofdesegregation, are discredited
as inconsistent with sociological expectations.

Introduction

The words of Martin Luther King, Jr.
rang loud in the segregated South: "I have
a dream that one day on the red hills of
Georgia the sons of fonner slaves and the sons
of fonner slaveowners will be able to sit down
together at the table of brotherhood" (D' Amato
1987, 357). Desegregation of the public
schools was one of the principal aims of the
civil rights movement led by King. The
National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (represented by Thurgood
Marshall) took to the court dockets for redress
of the wrongs that executives and legislators
had ignored. Now, thirty-four years after their
victory in Brown et al v. Board of Education
of Topeka (1954), a police brutality incident
in Los Angeles, a Hispanic uprising in our

nation's capital, and litigation from Mississippi
claiming that "unconstitutional vestiges of
desegregation remain and should be ordered
eliminated" have brought race relations once
again to the American consciousness (Appleborne 1991, A16). Desegregation has fallen
on hard times.
One avowed aim of desegregation was
the elimination of racism, "both root and
branch" (U.S. v. Mississippi, 1989). Measuring racial attitudes as a product of desegregation will reflect on the effectiveness of judicial
activism as well as the social influence of
education. Before discussing desegregation,
however, we must place it within the context
of a larger constitutional debate over what the
Supreme Court's role in such questions should
be.

The .Judicial Activism Debate

Methodology and Thesis

The debate over judicial activism has
its roots in the origins of American government. The Constitution did not explicitly grant
the authority of judicial review to the Supreme
Court. Now the Constitution is being interpreted by a Court which makes a broad range
of policy decisions that otherwise would be
reserved to the more "democratic" executive
and legislative branches. Wechsler and Berger
warn that "court decisions should be explicitly
based on neutral, general principles that
transcend a particular result"; otherwise, they
violate the separation of powers and threaten
democratic government (Rebell and Block
1982, 6, 8).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 echoes
this anti-activist stand on desegregation, saying
that it

The justifiability of judicial activism
depends, at least in part, on the measure of
its effectiveness. The major public school
desegregation cases spanning from the Brown
decision in 1954 down to the present will be
examined in conjunction with data from public
opinion polls that measure public responses
to this question: "Do you think white students
and black students should go to the same
schools or separate schools" (Gilbert 1987,
267)? It will be shown that while the Court
pursued desegregation, racial tolerance
increased; but during the period in which it
has become less assertive, there has been a
downturn in racial tolerance, suggesting that
the Court can and does influence racial
attitudes.

does not mean the assignment of students to
public schools to overcome racial imbalance and
that nothing therein empowers any official or
court of the United States to issue any order
requiring the transportation of pupils or students
from one school to another or one school district
to another in order to achieve racial balance
(Trenker 1989, 672-3).

The Court decided to desegregate at any cost.
Scholars who defend the Court's policy
making role argue that the rise of the welfare
state has led to the activist intrusion of all three
branches into· our lives and that the Court is
just keeping pace. While others question the
Court's abilities in fact-finding and remedial
action, defenders of activism argue that "courts
protect the basic constitutional rights of
minorities ... when other institutions are unwilling to deal with important social issues"
(Rebell and Block 1982, 1O). They argue that
the founders did not intend an absolute
separation of powers but rather a blending of
those powers as they were shared by three
coordinate branches of government.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
Much work has been done examining
the interaction of public opinion and Supreme
Court decisions. When the Court takes a stand
on visible and controversial issues, argue some
theorists, the body of thought that they uphold
is validated as "politically correct." The
legitimation hypothesis emphasizes the degree
of compliance and support that accompany
Supreme Court rulings (Marshall 1989, 135}.
Public opinion, according to this theory, would
be expected to shift favorably toward the position of the Court. Hence, the Court can and
does have a profound influence on Americans'
atti tudes and the nation's policy agenda.
The work of sociologist Cardell C.
Jacobson equips the legitimation hypothesis
with approximate controls for all variables
external to the ruling itself (social factors,
implementation, and other policies such as
affirmative action). He conducted a survey
in the months before and after a Milwaukee
desegregation ruling. Among those directly
affected by the ruling, 8.1 % fewer of them
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said that they would object to their children
attending racially balanced schools after the
ruling than before (1978, 703):
There were no increased intergroup contacts,
no changes in school feeder patterns, no
increased neighborhood integration. There was
only the ruling. Like several earlier investigators
of law and attitudes we have found that the law
can change public opinion (1978, 705).

Franklin and Kosaki fine-tuned the
legitimation hypothesis and renamed it the
positive response hypothesis, but argued that
the effects of the ruling on long-held social
values are mitigated as "social communication
processes become the dominant influence"
(1989, 766). These processes are defined as
interactions within an individual's own racial
or ethnic group. The reasoning behind this
theory is not unlike that which justified the
separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896). Other researchers have come
to the same conclusion. Muir and McGlamery
found that while white students displayed more
acceptance of blacks as classmates (from 56.4
percent in 1963 to 96.7 percent in 1982), "data
reveal that this trend has not just slowed but
actually reversed, with an increased portion
of white undergraduates believing that blacks
are relatively lazy, untrustworthy, immoral,
and vengeful" (1984, 968).
Longshore asserts that desegregation
may sow the seeds of its own destruction
because of a phenomenon that he calls
territorial instinct. He found that "even when
students of one race are greatly outnumbered,
their attitudes are more favorable than when
the school is racially balanced, because control
of the school is not in dispute" (1982, 675).
He proposes the use of situation-specific
remedies rather than universal judicial decrees.
Thus, most researchers assert that while
desegregation might have seemed like a good
idea at first, it has failed to achieve its desired

results in the long run. The case often singled
out for such analysis is Milliken v. Bradley
(1974), which was accompanied by a two point
positive poll shift from the pre- to postdecision
period, while the long term poll shift was
negative eight points (Marshall 1989147, 155).
It will be shown, however, that the negative
opinion shifts in the wake of Milliken reflected
the subtle "throttling back" of the Court on
desegregation. The explanatory value of the
legitimation hypothesis will be illustrated by
examining desegregation cases and placing
them on a public opinion continuum from 1954
to the present.
Findines

HNory of Public School Desegregation Cases

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) established
the doctrine of "separate but equal facilities"
for members of different races, citing congressional segregation of Washington, D. C.
public schools as justification. Brown v. Board
(1954) reversed Plessy, calling separate
facilities "inherently unequal," and stated that
the opportunity of education, "where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms"
(483). The Court had started down the road
to desegregation, a road that it would continue
to take until 1974.
Brown (II) (1955), issued one year
later, required compliance with the original
decree "with all deliberate speed". The
decisions met massive resistance, especially
in the South, but the Court in Cooper v. Aaron
(1958) unanimously reaffinnedBrown. When,
in 1964, Prince Edward County, Virginia
schools remained mostly segregated the Court
declared that "the time for more deliberate
speed had run out" (Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, 1964).
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School boards defended themselves by
saying that they allowed students the "freedomof-choice" to go to any school they chose, but
the Court held in Green v. New Kent County
School Board that "[the open-enrollment] plan
has operated simply to burden children and
their parents with a responsibility which Brown
1I placed squarely on the School Board" (1964,
430). The Court went farther out on a limb,
requiring not only that school districts allow
students to choose which school they would
like to go to, but that they also take steps
(busing being one) to facilitate racial diversity
in each school.
Opposition persisted. "[T]he Supreme
Court rejected [Nixon] Administration-sponsored delay requests in Alexander v. Holmes
County Board ofEducation (1969) and Caner

v. West Feliciana Parish School Board (1970)"
(Levy 1986, 559). By 1974, however, the
Court's resolve had eroded. Milliken v.
Bradley (1974) was the first case to strike
down ajudicial desegregation order, an order
involving several school districts, not all of
which discriminated. Thus, they rejected the
only possibility of having integrated schools
where "white flight" to the suburbs had left
a high concentration of minorities in inner-city
districts.
From 1974 on, the liberal-activist
judges (notably Brennan and Marshall) were
consistently on the dissenting side of desegregation opinions. More difficult standards for
proving discrimination were set forth in a
number of cases. "There was little judicial
enthusiasm for continued reliance on a
remedial process about which there was so
much controversy as to its effectiveness ... "
(Levy 1986, 560). In 1975, the Court
accepted partial desegregation in Calhoun v.
Cook and did basically the same thing in
Milliken v. Bradley 1I (1977). The Court held
that resegregation after integration need not
be corrected by the courts in Pasadena Board

ofEducation v. Spangler (1976). Finally, the
1982 Crawford v. Los Angeles Unified School
District case validated this California proposition: "State courts shall not order mandatory
pupil assignment or transportation unless a
federal court would do so to remedy a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause" (527).
While the Court has remained mostly
silent on public school desegregation cases
since 1982, it has allowed lower court rulings
to stand that have made it more difficult for
parent organizations to obtain standing
(Morgan v. McDonough 1984), has placed the
burden of proof squarely on those who
challenge a school district that has declared
itself unitary, and has granted "relief against
school board's 'bussing' plan to promote
desegregation" (Trenker 1989, 674). Still
other lower court decisions (such as United
States v. Mississippi [1989] and Whittenberg
v. School District [1985]) have relaxed
desegregation rules and been decided in favor
of the school districts whose policies are
challenged. Although they do not abandon
Brown, these lower court opinions (tacitly
approved by the Supreme Court) have departed
from the activist traditions of the 50s, 60s,
and half of the 70s. The recent conservativism
of the Court on racial issues can also be
illustrated by race-related cases such as Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education (1986) and
Bazemore v. Friday (1986) that have also
found Brennan and other desegregation
activists in the minority. An examination of
the history of these cases shows a shift in the
Court's posture on desegregation and racial
issues. How does this shift relate to patterns
in public racial attitudes? To this question
we turn next.

Evolution of Racial Attitudes

Brown was a watershed of racial
tolerance for Americans. In 1964 34.5 percent
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of eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds polled
said that they were in favor of deseg-regation.
By 1972, nearly 51 percent agreed. Between
1972 and 1974 (exactly when Milliken brought
the judicial pendulum swinging back to the
right) there was a sharp downturn and by 1978
only 32.8 percent polled were in favor of

desegregation--Iess than in 1964 (Converse
et al 1980, 64). This trend seems to have
persisted. A June 1990 Gallup poll reports
that only 33 percent of eighteen to twenty-nineyear-oIds polled feel like they have become
more tolerant of people of different colors and
races (Newport 1990, 32).

Supreme Court Cases
and Attitudes on Desegregation
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The declining proportion of positive
racial responses of students corresponds with
a similar pattern in their parents. A 1990
Gallup Poll found:
10% of whites saying they would object to
sending their child to a school where half of the
students were black. That proportion increased
to 31 % when asked if they would object to
sending their child to a school where more than
half of the children were black (Newport 1990,
25).

Polls show that there has been only a modest
increase (from 30 percent in 1973 to 37
percent in 1988) in those who feel that more
should be done to integrate our schools
(Shriver 1988, 46). These data show that
racism and separatism are not, as we might
like to think, unfortunate relics of the past.
The most continuous, representative,
and random data is provided in the figure
which traces overall public opinion on integration from 1940 to 1985. When the cases
we have examined are plotted along the x-axis,
we can see an almost linear increase of the
Brown to Caner period. After Milliken, the
trend stops and has flattened significantly as
the Court has become less active in school
integration.

Analysis
Review of the Data
In the figure, all shown cases from

Brown to Caner were decided in favor of
integration and were relatively activist decisions. Milliken in 1974 and all subsequent
cases did not reverse Brown but represent a
departure from the Court's activist position.
The pre-Brown period saw the initiation of
positive racial attitudes. This jump from 2
percent to 15 percent positive responses

coincides with the first two cases in which the
Supreme Court upheld the rights of black
citizens, Smith v. Allwright (1944) and Shelley
v. Kramer (1948) (Schaefer 1990,219). The
1954 Brown decision creates an even sharper
increase in positive responses, a trend that
continued until the Milliken decision. As
Figure 1 shows, since Milliken, the Court's
negative posture towards desegregation and
race related cases has corresponded with steady
or only minutely increasing positive public
responses to the question of integration.

Theoretical Implications
This analysis, particularly in light of
the dramatic shift in the early 1970s, supports
the legitimation hypothesis. To the extent that
this correlation is not mere coincidence,
alternative hypotheses are discredited.
Proponents of the positive response/ social communication hypothesis would
attribute this renewed polarization to the
influence of primary social institutions (friends
and family) and/or a resurgence of ethnicity.
However, most sociological models emphasize
assimilation or pluralism rather than conflict' .
After 300 years of cohabitation and black
attempts to assimilate into white society, we
should be able to expect successful integration.
Those sociologists who do predict a resurgence
of ethnicity do not expect this to occur until
the third generation after a strong push for
assimilation (in this case the Brown decision)
(Schaefer 1990, 142-3)2.
The territoriality theory is also discredited by the exact coincidence of Milliken
and the decline in racial attitudes. Moreover,
territorial conflicts could only be expected
where there is a nearly perfect balance of black
and white students. Blacks represent only 12
percent of the population and do not account
for 50 percent of the student body in a majority
of schools.
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The social communication or territoriality hypotheses would attribute the deterioration of racial attitudes to the failures of
desegregation (see Table 2). The data show,
however, that so long as the Court was willing
to take a stand in favor of desegregation,
public racial attitudes improved. The opposite
was true when the Court softened its activist
stance on desegregation. The legitimation
hypothesis is consistent with both trends.

Table I. Theories and implications.
HYPOTHESIS:

IMPLICATION:

Legitimation

Court lost resolve

Positive
Response

Desegregation failed

Territoriality

Desegregation failed

Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
Analysis of this type carries with it
the persistent subjectivity of the social sciences. People who agree generally to the
principle of desegregation may nonetheless
oppose specific remedies such as busing.
Politically correct professions of racial
tolerance might only mask the persistent hatred
of a "timid bigot" (Schaefer 1990, 56)3.
Another limitation encountered in this type
of study is that it is easier to explain conclusively the shifts in public opinion before and
after the first ruling on a controversial issue
than it is to explain shifts in opinion in concert
with subsequent rulings.
This study focuses on the aim of
improving racial tolerance; other research has
and will focus on the accessibility to quality
education and student attainment. Future
researchers might also look at the role of
media, the executive and legislative actions
of the same period, racial lobbying efforts,

and other political factors. Racial violence
is, unfortunately, an increasingly available
variable that will be useful for future studies.

Conclusion
By examining the relationship between
Supreme Court decisions and racial attitudes
we have seen the effect that the Court can and
does have on public opinion. The period of
activist desegregation coincided with dramatic
increases in racial tolerance. Since 1974,
however, the Court has taken a much more
conservative stance and public opinion has
deteriorated .
The implications are profound. Racial
tensions and conflict are on the rise. The
conservative Court's current session will
address desegregation for the first time in
years. The outcome will be as impressive as
Brown and therefore should be of great interest
to all of us. Just how effective can an activist
Court be in "correct[ing], by balancing of the
individual and collective interest, the condition
which offends the Constitution" (Trenker 1989,
672)? It can be very effective. Should the
Court assert itself as it did before 1974? It
should. Will Martin Luther King's dream ever
become a reality? We can only hope that it
will.

NOTES
1. See Richard T. Schaefer, Radal and Ethnic Groups
(Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Company, 1990),
p.43-47.

2. Schaefer refers to the work of Marcus Lee Hansen.
See The Problem o/the Third Generation Immigrant, (Rock
Island, Ill.: Swenson Swedish Immigration Research
Center, 1987).
3. See also Robertk K. Merton, Sodological Ambivalence
and Other Essays, (New York: Free Press, 1976).
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Covenant and Compact:
Bases for Citizen Obligation
by
David H. Moore

Views on the role of the government and the role of the citizen have changed in modern
America, leading to an idea that government is the provider of goods to be consumed and that
citizens have no obligations to with respect to the government. Thefounding documents ofAmerica
suggest that this is not so. Rather, the American founding is based on the ideas of covenant and
compact. Covenants and compacts require all parties to agree to certain obligations. Thefounding
of America and of American states was accomplished through covenants and compacts, and
consequently place obligations on citizens.
Introduction
Today, America's political and social
system suffers from what Daniel Elazar terms
consumerism. Instead of seeing themselves
as responsible citizens, many Americans
perceive themselves as consumers (Elazar
1988,82). The traditional idea of citizenship
as individual participation in the polity and
contribution to society (upon which our nation
was founded) has been supplanted by the
notion of residence, which allegedly entitles
the individual to demand benefits from a
government "out there," whose success is
measured by its ability to deliver (Elazar 1976,
4). In response, governments have solicited
greater resources in a "politics of purchased
solutions" which "substitutes money for
commitment" (21). This trend that is transforming citizenship into consumerism and
government into commerce has lead to
predatorial behavior and has eclipsed understanding of indi vidual responsibility to society
and to the polity. To combat this threat, we
must restore a true understanding of the
principles upon which our nation was founded:
the principles of covenant and compact. In
this essay, I will explain the concepts of
covenant and compact and show that our

system was founded on them. I will then
explore the obligations that result from our
national covenant and compact.

The Concepts of Covenant and Compact
The idea of the covenant, as Elazar
explains, comes from Hebrew scripture and
consists of a mutual promise voluntarily
effected by independent parties in the presence
of higher authority, often God. Covenants
are usually meant to be eternal and are often
political, though they also govern the divine
relationship between God and man (1988, 30,
90). As witnessed in the Bible, the covenant
places moral and legal obligations on all who
enter into it. The covenant people of Israel,
for example, were not only to measure their
products justly, but they were also to "be holy"
as the Lord was holy (Leviticus 19:2, 36).
Thus, the covenant bound all, including God,
to legal and moral virtue (Wardle 1987, 16).
While the American colonists, according
to Donald Lutz, often used the verbs "agree,"
"compact," and "covenant" synonymously,
there remains a difference between these
concepts (1988, 16, 19). Both covenants and
compacts involve consensual public agreements
and require participants to treat each other
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according to the spirit of the law and not
according to the narrow, contractual readings.
The covenant, however, differs from the
compact in that its moral aspects supersede
its legal aspects (Elazar 1988, 91; Lutz 1988,
18). Further, God is usually cited as a witness
in the covenant, while the people remain the
highest authority in the compact (Elazar 1988,
91; Lutz 1988, 17,28). As both Lutz and
Elazar recognize, the compact is a secular form
of the covenant which removes God as a party
and focusses on relationships between men
(Elazar 1988, 30; Lutz 1988, 28).
Locke best explained the notion of the
compact. He believed that in the state of
nature, men are free and equal (1689, 3). In
order to receive the benefits of community,
men make social compacts to form societies.
This voluntary agreement is the onlyway that
a legitimate political system may begin and
is "[t]he only way whereby anyone divests
himself of his natural liberty and puts on the
bonds of civil-society" (58). Once men unite
in society, they surrender the powers necessary
to accomplish the ends of that society and
submit to majority rule, limiting their own
freedom (60). Thus, the compact, like the
covenant, places limitations and obligations
on its integrants.

Citizen Obligations Inherent in Covenants
and Compacts
When men enter into a covenant, "[s]o
long as [the] authorities [of the covenant are]
. . . acting within the sphere of authority
established by the covenant, [men are] ..
obligated to obey" (Baldwin cited in Wardle
1987,16). As mentioned, even God becomes
subject to the covenant's terms (Wardle 1987,
16). Obedience to the law is thus the most
basic obligation emanating from a covenant
or compact.

John Finnis elucidates why covenantors
or compactors are obligated to obey. When
men enter a covenant or compact, he explains,
they do so for the common good, i.e., to
obtain rewards attainable only in a community
and only through the rule of law. He states
that, first, citizens must be law-abiding in
order to obtain the common good. Second,
where an act is made obligatory by law, the
citizen must perform that act to be law-abiding.
Thus, the citizen is obliged to execute acts
required by the law (1988, 316). At the very
least, then, any covenant or compact requires
participants to obey the law.
This is true; but more is required. As
Milton Knovitz notes, the voluntary nature
of the covenant provides a basis for both
political and moral obedience (Cited in Vetterli
and Bryner 1987,36). Similarly, the voluntary
social compact stipulates that people receive
the benefits of societal life and in tum owe
certain obligations, besides obedience (Cheney
1985, 7). They enjoy what Daniel Elazar
entitles "federal liberty. " When the Declaration
of Independence speaks of liberty as an
inalienable right, says Elazar, it does not refer
to an absolute liberty, but a federal liberty
(1988, 98). According to Elazar, "[f]ederal
liberty is necessary to prevent the disaster of
anarchy and the diseases of natural liberty"
(172) and consists of freedom to live in
accordance with the rules of the covenant (or
compact) that initiated the system (128). Acts
that violate the nature of the societal agreement
are anarchic and so justifiably prohibited and
punished by government (128). Thus, the
covenant and the compact not only oblige the
citizen to obey the laws, but also to live in
accordance with the spirit or principles of the
While obedience
covenant or compact.
remains a constant obligation for citizens of
all covenanted or compacted societies, the
principles that citizens must adhere to vary
depending on the nature of each covenant or
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compact. Therefore, after addressing arguments against the idea that covenants and
compacts provide a basis for citizen obligation,
and after documenting how covenant and
compact form the foundation of the American
polity and society, I will identify some of the
American citizen's obligations that stem from
that foundation.

Obligation of Those Born into the Covenant
or Compact ,
Locke, in his Second Treatise of
Government, identifies an alleged flaw in his
theory of the social compact: that except for
the original compactors, all men are born
under a government and so never have the
opportunity to voluntarily enter the social
compact into which they are born or to
establish another one (1689, 69). Locke
responds "that a child is born a subject of no
country or government." Children are raised
by their parents until they reach the age at
which they can choose independently what
society they will join (72). This choice can
be made through express or tacit consent (72).
For example, while a child may not expressly
offer his consent, if he accepts his father's
property, obtains other possessions within the
realm of that society, or enjoys some of the
benefits of that society, then he has given his
tacit consent and he is obligated to fulfill the
responsibilities of a citizen of that compact
(71, 73).
The Conventionalists, as Noel Reynolds
explains, offer a similar explanation to the
problem of birth under the covenant or
compact (1991). Like Locke, they believe
that a man can show his consent through his
actions as well as his words. They assert that
children are not full citizens, because they do
not have all the benefits of the society.
Consequently, children do not have the same
citizen obligations as do adults, and their

punishments for disobeying the law are less
severe. When, however, a child reaches an
age where he is free to leave the country or
change its laws through suffrage and political
participation, then he shows his acceptance
of the system by remaining under its j urisdiction and enjoying its benefits. Thus, even
those who do not participate in the original
covenant or compact do, at least in the United
States, have the opportunity to voluntarily
consent to or dissent from the system. Once
they consent, they are morally bound to fulfill
their citizen obligations.

The American Polity
Compact

as Covenant and

The fact that our political system was
formed by both covenant and compact is
evident from the pervasiveness of these ideas
before and at the time of the founding and
from the documents that affected the founding
of our nation and of our government: the
Declaration of Independence, the federal
Constitution, and the state constitutions.

The Pervasiveness of Covenantism in
Colonial America
The idea of the covenant was commonplace
and widely accepted in colonial America. As
Lynn Wardle notes in his article "The Constitution as Covenant," almost all the religious
sects and settlements that came to America
brought with them covenant theology: the
Pilgrims, the Puritans, the Anabaptists, the
Presbyterians, etc. (1987, 12). The Puritans,
most often recognized as the primary adherents
to and disseminators of covenantism, were,
according to Clinton Rossiter, "'obsessed with
the covenant or contract, relying on this handy
instrument to explain almost every relation
of man to man and man to God ". (cited in
Wardle 1987, 12). While Donald Lutz
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recognizes the expansive influence of the
Puritans, he maintains that the Calvinists were
also very familiar with covenant theology and
as the dominant religion in much of colonial
America, were even more influential in
spreading the covenant perspective (1988,
24-25).
Regardless of which sect was most
instrumental in spreading covenant theology,
the fact remains that about four-fifths of
colonial New England's church-attenders
belonged to Protestant faiths that taught the
covenant theology as an essential part of their
doctrine (Wardle 1987, 13). By 1780,
America boasted over 1900 congregations of
"'covenant theology' mainline denominations"
(Marty cited in Wardle 1987,23). Clearly,
covenantism was a widely accepted doctrine
in colonial America.

The Use of Covenant in Colonial America
Not only was covenantism a widespread
idea, but the idea of the covenant was put into
practice in organizing churches, "scientific
and reform societies, labor unions, and
professional associations as well as business
corporations" (Elazar 1988, 33).
Most
importantly, the covenant formed the base of
many of the colonial political organizations
(Wardle 1987, 12). Those of the Plymouth
Colony, for example, covenanted to form a
"body politick" when they arrived. Their
covenant, recorded in the Mayflower Compact,
reads:
Haveing undertaken, for the glorie of God, and
the advancemente of the Christian faith, and
honour of our king and countrie, a voyage to
plant the first colonie in the Northerne parts of
Virginia, doe by these presente solemnly and
mutually in the presence of God, and one
another, covenant and coml}ine our selves
togeather into a civill body politick; for our
betterorderingand preservation and furtherance
of the ends aforesaid; and by vertue hearof to

enacte, constitute, and frame such just and equa1l
lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and
offices, from time to time, as shall be thought
most meete and convenient for the generallgood
of the Colonie, unto which we promise all due
submission and obedience (cited in Mclaughlin
1932, 18-19).

Thus, they called upon God as a witness and
covenanted both to him and to each other to
establish a political system. Later, in 1639,
the people of Connecticut made a similar
covenant which is recorded in America's'" first
written constitution''': the Fundamental Orders
of Connecticut (Mclaughlin and Rossiter cited
in Wardle 1987, 14). In this document the
people agreed to "assotiate and conioyne
[them] ... selues to be as one Publike State
or Comonwelth; and .. enter into Combination
and Confederation togather" in order to
establish a government "according to God"
(perry 1978, 120). Other political documents,
like the 1636 Pilgrim Code of Law, were also
based on covenants (Lutz 1988, 25). The most
important of these is the Declaration of Independence, which created the American nation
through a covenant.

The Covenant as the Foundation of the
American Nation
In that famous document, "representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ... appealing to the Supreme Judge
of the world for the rectitude of [their]. .....
intentions, [and] ... in the name, and by the
authority of the good people of these colonies,
solemnly [declared] ...... That these United
Colonies are and of a right ought to be, FREE
and INDEPENDENT STATES" (perry 1978,
321). This statement embodies a tripartite
covenant between God as the witness, the
states and the United States (Elazar 1988, 106).
The representatives' recognition of the
"consent of the governed" as the basis for all
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government and the grievances against King
George, which suggest what the Americans
thought good government should be, constitute
the terms of that covenant (100, 105). Thus,
America as a nation was born out of and
remains founded on a covenant.
The Pervasiveness of Compact Philosophy
in Colonial America
Having established the influence of
covenant theology in America and having
shown that the American nation is based on
a covenant, I will now proceed to document
the influence of the idea of the compact and
its role in the founding of our political system.
once again, evidence of the expansive acceptance of this philosophy combined with
documentary examples of its practice in the
United States will prove that our system is
based simultaneously on the covenant and the
compact.
Like the concept of the covenant, that of
the social compact (that society and government are formed by the consent of those
involved) was widespread in colonial America
(Mclaughlin cited in Wardle 1987, 15). John
Davenport, a New Englander, explained the
idea of the social compact twenty years before
Locke did in the Second Treatise (15).
Preachers freely taught the doctrines of Milton
and Locke from the pulpit, making them
familiar to all (15). As Andrew Mclaughlin
pointed out, "[tlhe New Englander of 1780,
when he voted to ratify and establish the state
constitution, or later ... the Constitution of
the United States . . . would have been
perplexed had he been told that power,
authority, and obedience were not all the fruit
of the agreement" (1932, 84). All the men
educated in the thinking of the day "believed
that all decent government originated in
compact; they were not as yet far removed

from Milton's declaration that no one would
be so stupid as to deny it" (81).
The Use of the Compact in Colonial America
As a result of this widespread acceptance
of the compact and the secularization of the
covenant (Lutz 1988,28), the bulk of colonial
political structures were established as compacts. The 1641 Combination of the Settlers
Upon the Piscataqua River for Government
was the first intentionally secular covenant
and hence, compact (30). A host of political
compacts followed. The 1641 Massachusetts
Body of Liberties, for example, identified the
rights of the citizens and affirmed them" with
. . . sollemne consent" (Perry 1978, 148).
The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, recognized
that certain rights could not be wrested from
men by compact and that all political "power
is vested in ... the people" (311). In the
same year, the Constitution of Pennsylvania
thanked God (though it did not calion Him
as a witness) that "the people of this State,
by common consent," were able to establish
their own rules for their government (328).
Concurrently, the Delaware Declaration of
Rights and the Constitution of Maryland
declared "that all government of right originates from the people, is founded in compact
onl y , and instituted for the good of the whole"
(338, 346). Further, the 1780 Constitution
of Massachusetts explained that'" [T]he body
politic is formed by a voluntary association
of individuals. It is a social compact by which
the whole people covenants with each citizen
and each citizen with the whole people, that
all shall be governed by certain laws for the
common good'" (cited in Elazar 1988, 33).
All these documents testify that many if not
most colonial polities were founded on a
social, political compact.
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The Compact as the Foundation of the
American Political System
The most central political documents
of the modern United States are the federal
and state constitutions. Also influenced by
the widespread covenant/compact philosophy
of colonial times, these constitutions reveal
that America's modern governments and
political societies are based on compact. A
constitution, according to Lutz, is a document
that describes the political institutions and
structure of a society (1988, 34). In accordance with this definition, both the federal and
the state constitutions focus on describing the
structure of the governments they form.
The preambles of these constitutions,
however, identify them as compacts. The
federal Constitution, for example, reads, "We
the people of the United States ... do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America." This statement, enforced
by the fact that the federal Constitution was
ratified by the American people, established
the Constitution as the record of a national
compact.
Similarly all the state constitutions
begin with a preamble that says something like
this: We, the people of the State of
,
in order to obtain certain ends (for example,
justice, liberty and domestic tranquility) (1901
Constitution of Alabama in Legislative Drafting
Research Fund of Columbia University 1962,
1: 9) and grateful for the blessings of the
Almighty God, "do ordain and establish this
constitution" (1959 Constitution of Alaska in
Legislative Drafting Research Fund 1962, 2:
7). All the state constitutions, except those
of Oregon and Tennessee, mention God in
their preamble, giving them a decidedly moral
tone. The Constitution of West Virginia goes
so far as to say, "we, the people of West Virginia, in and through the provisions of this

Constitution, reaffirm our faith in and constant
reliance upon God" (2: 7). None, however,
call upon God as a witness to their agreement;
therefore, none constitute covenants. All do,
however, in the style of a compact recognize
that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people" (1912 Constitution of Arizona in
Legislative Drafting Research Fund of the
University of Columbia 1962, 1:9). The 1867
Constitution of Maryland goes further to
explain "[t]hat all Government of right
originates from the People, is founded in
compact only, and instituted solely for the
good of the whole" (1: 9). And the 1784
Constitution of New Hampshire further
articulates that "[wlhen men enter into a state
of society, they surrender up some of their
natural rights to that society, in order to ensure
the protection of others" (2: 7). Thus, the
preambles of the state constitutions--which
establish them as acts of the people of the
states and as a recognition of the principles
of the social compact--identify the state polities
as compacts.
Lutz explains that technically, the preambles in both federal and state constitutions
should come before the title constitution, for
what we have now are "really compacts in
which the constitution [the description of the
government's institutions] became predominant" (1988, 34). Regardless of where the
preambles figure in the text of the various
constitutions, they signal that the federal and
state political systems are formed by compact.
Some would argue that the federal
Constitution is actually a covenant. Lynn
Wardle, for example, traces the influence of
covenant theology in colonial America and
demonstrates how the Constitution and many
of the ideas in it emerged from the covenant
tradition and concludes that the Constitution
is a covenant (1987). According to our
definition of covenant, however, this conclusion cannot be valid, for the Constitution of
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1787 removed God as a witness and created
a secular compact (Elazar 1988, 136).
The federal Constitution, aside from being
a compact, may be said to embody a covenant.
As Elazar explains, "Normally a covenant
precedes a constitution and creates the people
or civil society that then proceeds to adopt
a constitution of government for itself. Thus
a constitution involves implementing a prior
covenant--effectuating [it] ... into an actual
frame or structure of government" (1988, 91).
This view seems plausible. We established
that the Declaration of Independence constituted a .national covenant which created us as
a nation or society. According to Elazar's
view, the Articles of Confederation and later
the Constitution can thus be seen as the
constitutions that established, through compact,
a political structure for that original covenant.

Citizen Obli&ations that Result from the
Covenant/Compact Foundation of the
American Political System
While the federal Constitution may be
considered a compact embodying a covenant,
it remains clear that the state constitutions are
compacts and that our national identity, created
by the Declaration of Independence, is founded
on a covenant. From these covenants and
compacts emerges a strong justification for
the obligation of American citizenship.

Obedience and Civic Duties
We have already noted that all covenants
or compacts require obedience to the laws.
Civil obedience, then, is an obvious obligation
of members of the American nation and polity.
But the obedience required of Americans must
be active not passive, says Associate Justice
Brewer (1909, 9293). Brewer, the Founders,
President Lincoln and others realized that a
greater degree of citizenship was required of

Americans, because they had been given so
much, and because the American system
locates political control in the hands of the
people (Brewer 1909,23). Lincoln reminded
a group of citizens in Indianapolis in 1861,
"that with [the citizen] . . . and not with
politicians, not with the President, not with
officeseekers, but with [the citizen] .. is the
question, 'Shall the Union and shall the
liberties of this country be preserved to the
latest generation?'" (Cited in Elazar 1988,
211). The United States citizen cannot transfer
his obligation to the government, because "[h]e
is the government" (Brewer 1909, 27)
Because the American compacts created
a representative democracy requiring citizen
participation, the American citizen has a host
of civic duties. According to Cheney, who
wrote to a juvenile audience, these civic duties
include participating in government in order
to influence laws, expenditures and taxation
(1985, 16-17), cooperating with authorities
to enforce the law (17), paying taxes fairly
(23), accepting a draft assignment or possibly
volunteering for the armed forces (30-32),
obtaining an education so as to be able to
participate intelligently in society (34, 3738),
casting informed votes (39-40), and cooperating in the community, realizing that we share
our world with others (51). Brewer notes
many of the same civic duties (Brewer 1909,
62, 64). Joseph Larsen, writing specifically
to Latter-day Saints, identifies two main civic
duties: electing good leaders and participating
in public decision-making and problem-solving
(1986, 14).

Moral Duties
Due to the fact that the American compact
established a republic, relying to a large extent
on self-control and not on government coercion, the responsibilities of the American
citizen do not stop with obedience to law and
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civic involvement. The American Founders
believed that man had a dual nature, capable
of both virtue and vice (Madison 1787, 15;
Hamilton 1787, 11; Vetterli and Bryner 1987,
170; Elazar 1988, 165). They knew that for
society to survive, men had to control their
vices (paine cited in Vetterli and Bryner 1987,
180). Because the American system would
not control its citizens, they would have to
moderate themselves. Thus, the Founders
expected a certain character from the American
citizen, a moderate virtue, and they knew that
without it, the system would fail (Vetterli and
Bryner 1987, 187).
Others have echO(li this view. Cheney
holds that citizens should do good because it
will benefit society as a whole, not because
it will bring them profit or allow them to
escape punishment. Brewer asserted that" each
citizen owes to the nation the duty of maintaining in himself a high, clean, moral character"
(1909, 35). He also advanced that citizens
have an obligation of willing, intelligent,
"unselfish and conscientious" service (61).
Finally, he believed that Americans have an
obligation to work to improve the nation's life

(109). In view of the blessings that we receive
from living in America, Brewer said, we
should strive to preserve and strengthen the
morality of the nation (109).
Conclusion
The list of moral and legal obligations of
the American citizen could continue. These
suffice to show that trends toward consumerism
and excessive individualism and away from
citizenship circumvent our true responsibility.
Adult American citizens who possess and enjoy
the property, public services and other benefits
of this system and who have means whereby
to participate in the system are legitimately
subject to obligations emanating from the
covenant expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and from the compacts recorded
by the federal and state constitutions. To
check any moves toward predatorial consumerism, we must resurrect an understanding
of our citizen obligations, teach them to our
populace, and begin to live them in order to
preserve the covenant and compact, which
constitute the foundations of our nation.
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The Advantages of Incumbency,
Candidate Image, and the Vote
by
Jonathan Mott

Candidate image is an important predictor of voting behavior in congressional elections.
Voters usually compare the qualities ofboth candidates and choose the candidate that they perceive
to be best. The evidence provided indicates that incumbents have an advantage under normal
circumstances, in establishing, reinforcing, and maintaining positive images of themselves in the
minds of the electorate. The source of this advantage for incumbents is the result of privileges
and the amount of time they can devote to campaigning. However, the decisive advantage of
incumbency is money. Incumbents raise and spend a great deal more money than challengers.
Incumbents are also able to utilize various mediaforms more extensively than challengers to build
positive images among voters. Further evidence is provided to show that once images are established,
incumbents fare even better, because these images become more stable and harder to change.
Public financing of elections, not term limits, is probably the best way to make congressional
elections competitive again.
Incumbents win because Americans despise Congress but love their particular Congressman,
who toils tirelessly to deliver services. Incumbents are entrenched by democratic choices, and
Americans have a constitutional right to democracy, not good government.
George F. Will
Introduction

In the boxing matches of congressional
elections, the weathered, reigning champions
usually come out on top. The young, bushytailed challengers often find out only after
stepping into the ring that they never had a
chance. More often than not, the champ,
flexing huge muscles of money and the perks
of office, soundly defeats all-comers. Indeed,
the matches fought in the ring are usually nocontest affairs.
It hasn't always been this way though.
There once was a time when the champ would
voluntarily step out of the ring, leaving the
contest to new, fresh faces. 1 Now, however,
there is a greater likelihood of the champ dying
in between matches than actually losing one.

Because of such odds, most viable contenders
are content to wait for the day the champ
meets with such a fate before they put on their
gloves and step into the ring. Challengers
once brought fierce competition into these
matches, but the most they muster now is
usually only token opposition. The judges of
these contests consistently declare the champ
the overwhelming winner.
Admittedly, the above analogy is not
perfect. The outcomes of elections, unlike
boxing matches, are influenced by more factors
than head-to-head comparisons and candidate
showdowns.
Partisanship, the political
environment, and a host of other variables
come into play when two candidates vie for
the same elected office. However, the fact
remains that competition has all but disap-
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peared from congressional races in America.
The "reigning champion" has an undisputed
advantage over challengers.
Back&roond
Numerous studies have attempted to
assess the importance of incumbency and other
factors of candidate image in congressional
elections. For many years, the consensus was
that congressional elections were largely
decided on the basis of national political
forces. Supporters of this thesis characterized
congressional elections in the following three
categories: (1) partisan affairs in which party
affiliation was the only important predictor
of voting behavior, (2) referenda on the
incumbent president's job performance, and
(3) the means through which voters could
either reward or punish members of Congress
for the condition of the economy (Niemi and
Weisberg 1984, 199). More recent research,
however, indicates that congressional elections
may indeed be more susceptible to local
influences than earlier studies had led political
scientists to believe. Much of this new
research rests on the assumption that candidate
qualities are important to voter choices and,
as a rule, incumbents are better known and
better liked (Niemi and Weisberg 1984, 204).
My thesis, and the impetus for writing
this paper, is an extension of these assumptions. I contend that the trappings of incumbency have allowed incumbents to become
better known and better liked than challengers,
thereby causing the demise of competition in
congressional elections. While this thesis is
accepted fairly well among political scientists,
there is room for elaboration. Indeed, the
trends in congressional elections mentioned
above have led to a heightened level of interest
in the study of candidate appeal and image;
however, most of the resulting research has
focussed on presidential candidates and their

campaigns. Furthermore, because relatively
few studies have been done to assess the link
between the advantages of incumbency and
the establishment of positive images by
congressional incumbents, there is reason to
examine this problem.
As I have noted briefly, there are a
host of factors which influence the outcome
of congressional elections. I contend, however, that the image and appeal of candidates
are becoming increasingly important factors
of voting behavior. This, coupled with the
fact that incumbents are far better equipped
to establish positive images in the minds of
voters than are challengers, leads to a serious
discrepancy in the viability of incumbent and
challenger candidates. My research indicates
that the major factor contributing to this
disparity is the huge advantage incumbents
enjoy in the fund raising aspect of electioneering.
In order to establish this relationship,
I have defined four objectives for this paper.
First, I will review the existing literature on
candidate appeal and image. Second, because
of the lack of a systematic approach to this
area of study, I will present my model of
candidate appeal and image. Third, I will
address the advantages of incumbency (with
an emphasis on the ability to raise money),
especially those which clearly give an advantage to incumbents in the campaign process.
Furthermore, I will show how these advantages
help incumbents to project positive images of
themselves in the minds of the electorate. I
will also assess the plausibility of tying these
images to voter choice. Fourth, and last, I
will elaborate on my argument which links
candidate image to voter choice, paying
specific attention to the theoretical bases of
my thesis and examine some models of voter
rationality. Having accomplished these tasks,
I will make some general conclusions about
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congressional races and offer some recommendations for reform.

PART I
Candidate Appeal and ImaKe
There has been relatively little research
done in the area of the appeal and image of
congressional candidates. There have been,
however, some very important developments
which would be foolish to overlook. Even
more important for the purposes of this paper,
though, many of these studies serve as both
a basis and launching pad for my own research
and subsequent conclusions.
First of all, I should address the school
of thought which rests on the assertion that
congressional races are, in fact, not local,
candidate-centered affairs at all, but nationally
driven political events. Proponents of this
school of thought point to early studies, based
on the 1958 Michigan election surveys, which
showed that voters, in general, knew little of
the candidates running for Congress in their
districts. This, in fact, is true. Most voters
still cannot recall the name of either candidate
when asked by pollsters. This fact, along with
other supporting evidence, has led many
researchers and political scientists to conclude
that congressional elections are not decided
on the basis of candidate saliency but on the
other, national factors mentioned above
(partisanship, presidential popularity, and the
status of the economy).
More recent studies and research,
though, have tended to refute this concept of
congressional elections. Much of the research
now shows that candidates are much more
important than was originally thought (Niemi
and Weisberg 1984,204). At the same time,
it is clear that incumbents are generally better
known and better liked. Even supporters of
the congressional elections as national events
thesis like Jacobson and Kernell admit that

on the individual level, there is little evidence
that voters actuall y base their voting decisions
on things like the state of their personal
economic situation (Jacobson and Kernell
1982).
Further contributions to the study of
candidate image by Mann and Wolfinger
support the idea that congressional elections
are influenced by local factors--especially the
qualities of the candidates (Mann and Wolfinger 1980). Mann and Wolfinger include things
like incumbency, name recognition, reputation,
and "preference" or favorability of candidates
in their discussion of candidate appeal and
image. In fact, they argue that voters do not
base their decisions solely on partisanship or
incumbency status as some authors have
concluded. What is more likely to happen,
they argue, is that voters will assess each
candidate, compare them, and choose the one
that they like best (Mann and Wolfinger 1980,
280). Consequently, even a candidate who
is perceived as "neutral" (neither negatively
nor positively) may win if their opponent's
image is sufficiently negative (see Box 1).
Mann and Wolfinger conclude that
candidate image and appeal are very important
predictors for the outcomes of congressional
elections (288). To support this contention,
they explain that most voters recognize2 the
names of both candidates in congressional
races (virtually all voters recognize the
incumbent's name and about two-thirds
recognize the challenger's name). Furthermore, most voters can also attribute qualities
and values to each candidate. Though these
voter perceptions are based on thin information
and are highly personalized, they have a
dramatic impact on voter decisions (Mann and
Wolfinger 1980, 288).
One of the most comprehensive looks
at candidate image was published in 1976.
Nimmo and Savage, in their book Candidates
and Their Images, concluded through their
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research of presidential, congressional, and
other elections that candidate image is a
function of both candidate "projects" and voter
perceptions (31). They further concluded that
candidate images are based on what voters
perceive of each candidate's actions and traits
(50-63). In fact, because of this perceptual
model of voter imaging, they contend that
candidates may often have more than one
image in the eyes of the electorate (73). In
the end, they conclude that their work was

but a beginning in the area of candidate appeal
and image. Based on their research, though,
they concluded that image does effect voter
choice, but the link between the two was not
yet fully understood (208-9).

A Model for Candidate Appeal and ImaKe
The problem that Nimmo and Savage
pointed out is still largely unsolved. Sheer
logic will confirm the idea that candidate

Bill Orton vs. Karl Snow: Who's Image was Better?
Reasons for Voting
for Bill Orton
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Box 1.

In 1990, Bill Orton upset Karl
Snow in the race for Utah's 3rd
Congressional District seal Many
observers have argued, though, that
Orton's victory was more due to
Snow's negative image than to
Orton's positive image.
Notice that the graphs at the left
show a much larger percentage of
Orton's votes as votes cast against
Snow than vice versa. It is quite
possible that Orton was viewed as
neutral because he was fairly
unknown. Snow's image, however,
had become increasingly negative
after the primary. Apparently, a
candidate need not have a strong,
positive image in order to win--it
only bas to be more positive than
the opponent's image.
( Data taken from KBYU's 1990
Utah Colleges Exit Poll)
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image has an impact on voting behavior.
However, it is possible to show this causality
with some degree of certainty. In this pursuit,
under the tutelage of Professors David
Magleby and Bud Scruggs, I have constructed
a model of candidate image and appeal. This
three-part model accounts for, in my estimation, each facet of a candidate's image. The
model is diagramed in Figure 1.
While the chart is, for the most part,
self-explanatory, I will briefly describe the
reasoning behind the model. As I mentioned,
I believe that this model accounts for all

aspects of candidate appeal and image. In the
two boxes, I have summarized the characteristics and experiences of candidates which
makes them what they are. (Because of the
"political" nature of candidates and candidacy,
I thought it logical to separate "personal
appeal" from "political identity. ") These
candidate traits are communicated to voters
directly, through the media, and through
candidate campaigns. Through the campaign,
the candidate will attempt to convey a positive,
tailored image to the voting public. Not only
do candidates seek to accomplish this goal
through paid media

A MODEL FOR CANDIDATE APPEAL AND IMAGE
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and staged events, but they also attempt to
control how the news media projects their
images.
Admittedly, this is not a perfect model.
All races are not alike. The less visible the
race, the less likely voters are to know much
about the candidates involved. Additionally,
depending on the severity or intensity of any
one of the candidate's characteristics, the
campaign may have only a minimal effect in
projecting a positive image. For example,
David Duke is currently trying to portray
himself as the best choice for the president
of the United States in 1992. However, his
affiliation with the Ku Klux Klan, a huge part
of his political identity, will undoubtedly
obscure the images he attempts to project
through his campaign. 3 Furthermore, if
candidates attempt to represent themselves as
something that they are not, or try to obscure
an embarrassing part of their past, the media
will most likely alert the voters to the candidate's "real" identity.
As the literature indicates, though, a
candidate's image is an important factor of
voter choice, and my model begins to explain
why that is the case. Most authors agree that
candidate image and appeal have a direct
impact on voter choice. In fact, many scholars
argue that it is at least the most important short
term predictor of voting behavior (Flanigan
and Zingale 1991, 114). The ability to project
a positive image is a very important factor in
campaigning.
These conclusions naturally lead to the
following question: What kind of candidates
have the best images? Secondly, why do these
candidate's have images that are more positive
than others? The remainder of this paper will
be devoted to answering these two questions.

PART II
The Incumbent Advanta&e
The answer to the first of the two
question just posed is clear. Incumbents are,
by far, better known and better liked than their
challengers. Incumbents are almost always
reelected.
Moreover, they usually win
handily. Vital Statistics on Congress, a
publication of Congressional Quarterly Press,
puts incumbents who sought reelection to
House seats in 1990 into the following three
categories: (1) those who won more than 60 %
of the vote, (2) those who won less than 60 %
of the vote but were still reelected, and (3)
those incumbents who were defeated. In 1990,
312 out of the 435 races were won by incumbents in the first category while only fifteen
fell into the third category (Ornstein, Mann,
and Malbin 1991,80-1). Why are incumbents
so formidable? Simply put, it is because they
have an overwhelming advantage in terms of
political firepower.

The Perks of Office
Members of Congress have a vast
number of resources at their disposal. In
researching these resources, David Vogler
found that the "perks" of office--things like
personal staff allowances for members of
Congress (around fifteen staffers are allowed
for Representatives and about twice that many
for Senators), the franking privilege, and travel
allowances that permit congressmen to return
home nearly every weekend--cost the taxpayers
between $500,000 and $1 million per congressperson per year (1988, 88). Vogler specifically points to the increasing staff sizes, which
have permitted members of Congress to run
state and district offices for constituent
services, as a major source of advantage for
incumbents (224). While Vogler's assertion
that the main purpose of these home offices
is to help incumbents get reelected (225) may
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be a little strong, the political benefits they
provide for incumbents are tremendous.
Besides those listed above, there are many
other resources which contribute to incumbent
advantages.
Because each of these perks and
advantages offers unique opportunities to
members of Congress which allow them to
build positive images and increase their
advantage over challengers, they deserve to
be addressed individually.
While these
advantages are numerous where the formation
and development of candidate appeal and image
are concerned, the most important advantages
are constituency service, the franking privilege,
time, exposure and reputation, and the ability
to raise money.
Constituency Service. In his book Congress:
Keystone of the Washington Establishment,
Morris Fiorina adds to the weight of Vogler's
conclusions about the ability of incumbents
to provide services to their constituencies
(1989). In the newly added Chapter 11 of his
second edition, though, Fiorinaclarifies some
misunderstandings about his arguments. He
makes it clear that, by no means is constituent
service the deciding factor leading to the domination of congressional elections by incumbents. In fact, he contends that constituency
service accounts for only about five to eight
percentage points of an incumbent's advantage
over challengers (99). He argues further that
the polling resources, the ability to raise
money, and the generally poor quality of
challengers are other, possibly more dramatic,
advantages or factors of incumbent domination
(99-100).
Still, constituent service is one of the
best tools a member of Congress can use to
build a positive image in his or her district.
Not onl y do the people who receive assistance
from the congressperson' s office become
endeared to the officeholder, but they spread

the story of how they were helped among their
friends. Indeed, it is as George Will once
wrote: "Incumbents win because Americans
despise Congress but love their particular
Congressman, who toils tirelessly to deliver
services" (Will 1990, 236). Furthermore, the
advantages of constituent service become even
more pronounced the longer a congressperson
is in office. Not only does the aggregate of
services rendered amass a sizeable support
base among the electorate as time passes, but
a senior member of Congress is better
equipped to supply even more services. Jewell
and Patterson maintain that the seniority
system, especially in the House, leads to a
Congress where the longer members are in
office, the greater is their ability to "deliver"
and, therefore, get reelected (Jewell and
Patterson 1986, 116).

The Franking Privilege. Direct mailings are
one of the most touted campaign tactics of
recent times. While there are some limits on
the use of the franking privilege in Congress,
members send out reams of letters each year
to their constituents, "free of charge"--which
is the literal meaning ofJrank. While his study
is somewhat dated, David Mayhew found that
out of the 158 House members who were
elected in the mid-1960s, 121 said that they
sent out regular news letters to their constituents, and eighty-nine periodically sent out
mail questionnaires (Mayhew 1974,50). Since
then, the use of franked mail has become even
more pervasive. 4 Some members of Congress
go as far as to send letters of congratulations
and information on baby care to the new
parents in their districts. All of these mailings
add up to a powerful campaign tool. Challengers, on the other hand, must pay thousands
of dollars each time they want to cover the
district with letters.
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Time. While time is not an exclusive gift given
to members of Congress (they still have only
twenty four hours in each day), incumbents
have a clear advantage in the amount of time
they have available for campaigning. While
in office, a member of the House or Senate
spends a large amount of his or her time
preparing for the next election. Most begin
serious preparations at least a year in advance
(Salmore and Salmore 1985, 71). Scruggs
contends that the power of office allows
candidates to mold their images over time
(Scruggs 1991). To support this notion, he
points to the efforts of Orrin Hatch, a Utah
Senator, to increase his support among women.
According to some post-election polling,
Hatch's consultants found that he wasn't faring
too well with women. Consequently, the
Senator has, for the past six years, shifted his
focus to women's and children's issues. He
has sponsored an annual Women's Conference
in Salt Lake City and has taken issue stances
that, according to survey research, women
are more responsive to than men. s Members
of Congress are, in effect, constantly campaigning while their challengers are not blessed
with nearly as much time to mold their images
among voters.

Exposure and Reputation. As previously
noted, incumbents are generally better known
and better liked than their challengers. Much
of this is due to their ability to communicate
directly, and indirectly, with constituents
(Salmore and Salmore 1985, 61). While the
franking privilege contributes significantly to
this advantage, other facets of incumbency
are also important and contribute to further
incumbent-challenger disparities. For example,
incumbents enjoy a decisive margin in name
recognition over challengers. One survey
found that incumbents had a 92 % name
recognition while challengers were at a much
lower 54% (Jewell and Patterson 1986, 44).

Once an incumbent's name is well known, a
relative lack of news coverage can also
contribute to a positive candidate image.
Scruggs argues that one of the most important
aspects of incumbent advantage is that, once
the member of Congress has established a
positive image, most voters feel that "no news
is good news" (1991). Voters are willing to
assume that if they hear nothing, the representative or senator is doing their job, and
doing it well. This is especially true for
members of Congress who have won their first
reelection bid (Scruggs 1991).
Media coverage, while potentially
devastating, can build and strengthen an
incumbent's positive image as well. Many
opportunities are available for members of
Congress to get "free" or "earned" media
coverage. Mayhew's study found that fortyeight of the Representatives he interviewed
wrote regular columns in local newspapers
or magazines, and another eighty-two regularly
reported home by means of radio or television
(Mayhew 1974, 50). At least one Congressman
has even run his own radio program (51).
Members of Congress are able to
contact large numbers of voters through the
means listed above. Many congresspersons
even make a habit of appearing at social events
unannounced or speaking at "non-political"
functions. One congressman is said to have
never lost a precinct where he gave a high
school commencement speech (Mayhew 1974,
50). Activities such as these, combined with
campaign activities (to be discussed later),
allow incumbents to contact a surprisingly
large number of voters. In contrast, American
National Elections Study (ANES) data shows
that most voters are never contacted by
challengers (see Figure 2). In fact, congressional incumbents are able to contact almost 90 %
of voters before the election while challengers
contact less than 45 %. In other words, about
twice as many voters have had contact with
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the incumbent than the challenger. Since
challengers are rarely even able to contact a
majority of voters, it follows that they are
seldom able to convince a majority of voters
to fire the incumbent and hire the challenger.
This discrepancy in voter contacts
increases the longer a member of Congress
is in office. Obviously, the longer a congressperson serves, the better they become

known by their constituents. Mann found that
voters, in response to specific questions about
candidate traits, chose the "Don't Know"
response only 15-25 % of the time in regard
to long term incumbents. The numbers went
up to 20-45% for new incumbents, 40-60%
for challengers with prior exposure, and 6075% for new challengers (Mann 1984,262).
By utilizing the advan

Number of Contacts by Candidates
% of Voters Contacted by:

Challengers

Incumbents

I CONTACTS

3.5

4

16.5

(N-3948)
(Data
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tn. ANES 1990)

(N=4742)
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reported figures will reveal an alarming trend-challengers are being out spent buy a large
margin. Figure 3 shows incumbent and
challenger spending in U. S. House races from
1976 through 1990 (the figures are in mean
net dollars). The graph illustrates two clear
trends. First, the overall level of campaign
spending has increased every year for more
than a decade. In fact, rises in campaign
spending have exceeded the overall inflation
rate (Abramowitz 1991, 49).
However, the second trend, which is
not completely illustrated by the graph, is that
challenger spending has decreased

tages I have described, a member of Congress
can foster positive images while becoming
increasingly well known. The more established an incumbent's image becomes, the
more difficult it becomes, under normal
circumstances, (; to change that image.

The Ability to Raise Money
The ability of incumbents to raise
money may be their biggest advantage over
challengers in congressional races. Due to
strict campaign expenditure reporting laws,
there is very good data on both challenger and
incumbent spending. Merely glancing at the
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sharply. The drop in challenger spending,
which started in 1984, is even more dramatic
when inflation is controlled for. Adjusted for
inflation, overall challenger expenditures
dropped 30% during the 1980s (Abramowitz
1991, 51). While House challengers were,
on the average, only out spent by about
$30,000 dollars, or 36%, in 1976, they were
out spent by an average of almost $290,000,
or 73%, in 1990.
Similar spending trends are apparent
in Senate races as well. Figure 4 shows
campaign expenditures for Senate races from
1976 through 1990. Here again, the overall
cost of running a campaign has skyrocketed
from about $625,000 for incumbents in 1976

to more than $3.5 million in 1990 (the figures
are in mean net dollars). Challenger expenditures have also increased, but not at the same
rate. In 1976, challengers were out spent by
only about $160,000, or 30%. But, by 1990,
the gap had grown to more than $1.7 million,
or 52 %. While both challenger and incumbent
expenditures dropped in 1990, the proportion
is essentially unchanged.
The reasons for this discrepancy in the
ability to raise money are simple. People most
often donate their money to the candidate that
is most likely to win. This is especially true
of Political Action Committees which, in 1988,
gave 75 % of all their
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contributions to incumbents (Magleby and
Nelson 1990,53-4). PAC money accounted
for almost 40% of all House campaign
expenditures in the same year.

PARTm
The Implications of the Incumbent Advanta&e
While it is obvious that incumbents are
better equipped to run election campaigns than
are challengers, it is more difficult to assess
the impact of this disparity on candidate
salience. What is the overall effect of these
discrepancies between incumbents and challengers?

Election Results
The most important result of the
discrepancy between the fund raising abilities
of incumbents and challengers is the outcome
of elections. As previously stated, incumbents
almost always win their reelection bids, and
they usually win by large margins. In 1988,
fifty-six of the 435 House races were uncontested, and 70% of the 435 were won by
incumbents who won more than 65 % of the
votes cast (Will 1990, 236). A grand total
of five incumbents (about 2 %) seeking
reelection were defeated in the same year
(Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1990, 79). In
1990, there were seventy House incumbents
who ran unopposed (Ornstein, Mann, and
Malbin 1991, 74). There were even three
unopposed Senate races, where competition
is usually much stronger (Ornstein, Mann, and
Malbin 1991, 78).
This trend toward incumbent domination in congressional races was recognized by
Mayhew in the early 1970s (Mayhew 1974)
and was reassessed by Fiorina (1989). Both
authors came to similar conclusions--the
"marginal", or closely contested, races for

House seats were becoming a thing of the past,
and, to a lesser degree, the same trend was
appearing in the Senate. Fiorina attributes
this trend to the advantages of incumbency-especially constituent service--and the declining
strength of challengers (1989, 17-28).

The Absence of Strong Challengers
One development that cannot technically
be called an advantage of incumbency which
has, nonetheless, contributed to the entrenchment of incumbents in Congress is the lack
of strong challengers. However, in pointing
to this trend as a cause of incumbent domination, it is important to point out that this
argument is somewhat tautological. It's the
same old question with a new twist--Which
came first? The strong incumbent or the weak
challenger?
Much like the "chicken or the egg"
question, this query may never be fully
resolved. However, one thing is quite clear-the trend toward weak challengers feeds the
already formidable bias toward incumbents
in elections. Jacobson supports this notion
when he points out that incumbency alone does
not account for high reelection rates. They
are a function of both the highly positive
images of incumbents and the comparatively
much more negative images of challengers
(Niemi and Weisberg 1984,204). But, why
are challenger images so much worse than that
of incumbents?
A recent article by Banks and Kiewiet
presents convincing evidence that weak
challengers7 are more likely to run against
incumbents, while strong challengers are more
inclined to wait for an open-seat race (Banks
and Kiewiet 1989, 1013). Their reasoning
behind this conclusion is straightforward: weak
candidates have a better chance of beating an
incumbent than winning a major party's
nomination in an open seat race, while the
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odds for strong candidates are reversed (1014).
This scenario becomes somewhat of a selffulfilling prophecy because, for the most part,
"weaks" confine their election bids to races
against incumbents, thereby avoiding a tough
primary against a strong candidate. Likewise,
strong candidates sit it out until their chances
of winning are maximized. When weak candidates run against incumbents, they win
significantly more often than when they run
in open-seat races (Banks and Kiewiet 1989,
1(08).
The inability to raise the large sums
of money required to run a competitive race

against an incumbent is also a major deterrent
for even fairly strong candidates. Abramowitz
argues that this fact contributes directly to
incumbent dominated electoral success (1991,
34).

The Effects of Money on Electoral Competition
Having established the fact that
challengers cannot raise money with near the
success enjoyed by incumbents, I now turn
to an explanation of the direct effects of this
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discrepancy. First of all, let's take another
look at the 1988 election results for House
races. As I stated earlier, Vital Statistics put
incumbents who ran for reelection into three
categories: those who won by large margins,
those who won close races, and those who
lost (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1991, 8081). When the margins these incumbents won
by is compared with the margin by which they
out spent their challengers, an interesting trend
appears (see Figure 5). Incumbents who won
their reelection bids with 60% or more or the
votes out spent their challengers six to one,
with average expenditures of $362,000 to $61,000, for a difference of over $300,000 (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1991, 80). Those
who won reelection with less than 60% of the
vote out spent challengers by an even larger
amount ($615,000 to $248,000 for a difference
of $367,(00), but by a smaller percentage-they spent 2.5 times as much as their challengers. Even incumbents that lost spent more
than their challengers, but the margin is about
the same--$674,000 to $445,000, for a
difference of $229,000, or 1.5 times as much
as challengers.
In assessing this data, it is important
to keep two things in mind. First, of the 435
House races in 1990, incumbents in the first
category were often unopposed or only faced
token opposition. This accounts for the
markedly low spending levels of the challengers they faced. Second, while it is apparent
that incumbent spending is a function of
challenger expenditures, it is also true that high
incumbent expenditures are usually the result
of political trouble and low favorable ratings.
Furthermore, when an incumbent is in "trouble, " the challenger's chances of raising money
are much better because potential donors pay
attention to polls. The problem is, though,
that there were 406 incumbents who sought
reelection in 1990 and only 23 % of those won
less than 60% of the votes, and overall, 96%
of them won (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin

1990, 59 and 80). Competition was almost
nonexistent, and very few incumbents were
in the kind of "trouble" that would have
opened the door to challenger competition.
While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to establish which is the deciding factor
of competition--challenger money or a decline
in incumbent image--it is important to keep
in mind that both are important in races where
incumbents actually lose.
Abramowitz argues that a challenger's
ability to get information to the public and take
on the incumbents image is direct! y connected
to his or her ability to raise money (1991, 54).
In fact, he argues
Electoral accountability requires effective
competition. It is not enough to allow challengers to criticize the performance of incumbent
officeholders. Unless challengers have the
resources to communicate with the pUblic, voters
will not have the information they need to make
an informed choice .... Political stagnation and
one-party rule are the consequences of an
electoral process which renders incumbents
almost invulnerable to defeat (54).

He also points out that it is more important
than ever for challengers to spend large
amounts of money if they hope to beat an
incumbent (51). According to his research,
challenger spending is now the best indicator
of competitiveness8 in congressional races
(44). Furthermore, he asserts that in addition
to the increasing inability of challengers to
keep up with incumbent spending (see Figures
3 and 4), challenger expenditures, dollar for
dollar, now have less impact on an incumbent's
margin in polls and election results than ever
(52).
King and Gelman further contend that
electoral responsiveness to challenger campaigns against House incumbents has decreased
dramatically since 1946 (1991, 130). They
attribute 30% of this decline in responsiveness
directly to incumbency, while suggesting that
the rest of the change may be due to the large
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number of powerful candidates with vast
resources who were drawn into congressional
races after World War II due to the heightened
desirability of elected office (130).
Even incumbents without vast resources, though, are able to raise large sums
of money, which allows them to use the media
and other means to have "repetitive persuasive
communication with likely voters," which,
according to Beaudry and Schaeffer, in their
book Winning State and Local Elections, is
the key to electoral success (1986, 2). Mann
and Wolfinger also come to a similar conclusion. An incumbent's advantage in image can
largely be attributed to the ability of incumbents to contact voters (see Figure 2) (Mann
and Wolfinger 1980,283). In order to contact
thousands of voters, a candidate needs a
sizeable amount of money. If these contacts
can be made, though, images are planted and
voting decisions are affected.

Incumbent and Challenger Campaigns
Due to their decisive advantage in fund
raising, incumbents generally have better
organized, better run, and more effective
campaigns. However, there are some disadvantages to being an incumbent. As I indicate
in note number five on the Orrin Hatch story,
some positions taken or votes cast as a member
of Congress can have a negative impact on
an incumbent's image. Furthermore, incumbents, to a large degree, are limited in their
ability to project carefully crafted images of
themselves through campaigns. While a
challenger's "canvass" is blank, ready to be
painted by creative consultants and campaign
managers, the image on the incumbent's
canvass is relatively complete, leaving only
room for "touching up" (Scruggs 1991).
Another factor which may hurt incumbents
somewhat is the "throw the bums out" mood
which is spreading throughout the American
electorate. 9 Furthermore, voters receive

impressions of candidates from sources other
than the candidate's campaign (see Figure 1),
and more scrutiny is usually given to the
incumbents record in the media.
Nonetheless, incumbents still enjoy a
decisive advantage in campaigning. Researchers have concluded that this advantage
does, in fact, impact voting behavior. In three
case studies, Mann found that voters responded
to campaign efforts to portray crafted images
of candidates (1984). Voters were also found
to be responsive to a campaign's efforts to
characterize the opponent (Niemi and Weisberg
1984,262-3). In these instances, the "political
dialogue" of the candidates became part of
the public's perceived image of them, and
consequently, part of the rationale behind the
choices made on election day.
One related aspect of a candidate's
image which I have not addressed is job
performance. According to ANES data from
1974 to 1988, when voters disapprove of the
incumbent's job performance, they are more
than three times as likely to vote for the
challenger. However, only about 10% of
voters polled stated that they disapproved of
the incumbent's performance. Overall positive
ratings of incumbents are common in preelection polls and exit surveys, and it is not easy
for challengers to overcome these popular
images. More ANES data shows that even
when a challenger is rated as "hot" on the
candidate salience thermometer, they only win
12 % of the time.
The visibility of the challenger is an
essential ingredient of competitiveness. When
challengers wage competitive campaigns
(mostly due to, for some reason, an increased
ability to raise money), knowledge of both
candidates increases and challengers do much
better (Niemi and Weisberg 1984, 263).
Conversely, incumbents have a clear advantage
in obscure elections.
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PART IV

The Stability of Candidate Ima&es
The evidence which I have presented
substantiates my model of candidate appeal
and image. It also lends support to a model
of voter decision making. There is considerable evidence supporting the idea that the
more established a candidate's image becomes,
the more difficult that image is to change.
The conclusions drawn by researchers in this
area supports the assertion that voters, upon
receiving information about a candidate, filter
the infonnation is through existing infonnation,
instead of viewing it objectively. This
contributes to stable candidate images among
voters. One possible way of thinking of voter
imaging and decision making is illustrated in
Figure 6. Because there is nothing obvious
about this model, I will first explain my
reasoning behind it.

The Voter Thought Process
Some recent studies of public opinion
and voting behavior have focussed on the
thought processes that people go through when
they receive information and form opinions
and images of candidates. Lodge, McGraw,
and Stroh, all of The University of New YorkStony Brook, have developed an "impressiondriven" model of voting behavior and opinion
formulation (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh
1989). Their model holds that "evaluations
are formed and updated 'on-line' as information is encountered" (399). The implication
of their assertion is that voters only selectively
rely on the candidate infonnation they have
been exposed to. In fact, they argue that
voters make judgements of the information
they receive in light of the information that
they have already taken in. Because voters
perceive political information selectively, the
"mix of evidence available in memory [about
candidates] is a nonveridicial representation

of the information to which subjects are
exposed" (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989,
399). Voter choice, then, becomes a function
of cognitive perception, which filters new
information through existing beliefs and
attitudes.
Further supporting evidence for this
model is provided by Conover and Feldman
who argue that, even though candidates are
ambiguous and very seldom take strong issue
stances, voters will often associate issue
stances and ideologies with candidates (1989).
Their contention is that voters, based on their
individual political beliefs and minuscule
candidate cues, infer the existence of these
candidate stances (312). In other words, a
voter's beliefs about the specific issue stances
taken by candidates are more a function of
the voter's inferences than of reality. Consequently, once images of candidates are fonned,
voters will view new information through the
filter of those images. They will then make
inferences about the newly encountered facts
in order to bring them in line with their
existing opinions.
Flanigan and Zingale also examine this
phenomenon of voting behavior in their book

Political Behavior ofthe American Electorate
(1991). They point out that individuals are
unwilling to accept facts that are contrary to
their opinions or beliefs (145). Consequently,
people have several defense mechanisms
against "the potential dissonance represented
by new information that conflicts with their
existing attitudes" (145). These mechanisms
include selective exposure, or ignoring pieces
of conflicting infonnation, selective perception,
or misinterpreting the infonnation or rejecting
it by discounting the credibility of the source,
compartmentalization, or not linking the new
infonnation with the previously held, conflicting attitude or opinion, and rationalization,
or developing a false explanation for the new
information in order to avoid the real one
(145). Flanigan and Zingale also argue that
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strongly held beliefs are more closely protected
by these mechanisms than others; therefore,
political views are fairly changeable. However, I point to their conclusion that "typically,
individuals will change dissonant patterns in
the easiest way" possible (145). Because of
this tendency, it is likely that the longer an
image of a candidate is held, and the more
an incumbent is able to reinforce that image,

the more filters there are for new information
to pass through. It, therefore, becomes harder
to improve or attack that image, under normal
circumstances, the longer they are held.
The way voters perceive candidates
and make voting decisions about them, then,
can be thought as illustrated in Figure 6.
Notice that the incumbent/challenger variable
is prior to all of the means through

INCUMBENT ADVANTAGES, IMAGE, AND THE VOTE
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which voters receive candidate images. The
model also takes into account the fact that
campaign efforts are not solely aimed at
directly influencing voters but also at influencing the way the media projects the candidate's image.
PART V

Conclusion and Recommendations
Competition is a thing of the past in
congressional elections. No longer does the
United States of America have a citizen
legislature where men and women go, for a
tum, to serve as representatives of the people,
and then return to their constituencies and
allow others their "tum." While some arguments can be made in favor of the professionalization of Congress, both fiscal and
electoral accountability have gone out the back
door as incumbency has dead-bolted the front
door. Abramowitz was right. Electoral
accountability does demand competition; but
incumbents are working harder than ever, with
higher rates of success than ever, to make sure
that competition doesn't resurface.
In response to a seemingly unresponsive, incumbent dominated electoral process,
American voters have become caught up in
a populist "throw the bums out, reelect no
one!" sentiment. Three states have now placed
term limits on their state office holders.
Oklahoma's voters passed a ballot proposition
in November of 1990 that limits the terms of
state legislators to a total of twelve years
(Moss 1990). In the same year, California's
Proposition 140 won the support of voters,
thereby limiting the terms of state assemblymen to six years and state senators to eight.
It also eliminates legislator pensions and
slashes $60 million from the state legislature's
operating fund (Uhler 1990, 1).10 In Colorado, 71 % of the voters approved a measure
setting an eight year limit for state elected
officials. Moreover, it also limited the terms

of the state's members of Congress to twelve
years (Moss 1990). A similar measure was
narrowly defeated in the state of Washington
in November of 1991. 11
While the idea of term limits on the
members of Congress is overwhelmingly
popular, it might cause more problems than
it would solve. In an article in the Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, Ornstein argues
that there isn't an "easy way to take arrogance
and excessive ambition out of politics [and]
bring enlightened amateurism back to governance" (l991a). Limiting terms, he asserts,
would only fill members of Congress with
more "corrupt ambition," as they begin
campaigning for the Senate the day they enter
the House, or begin "cozying up" to lawyers
and lobbyists in order to secure jobs for
themselves after their limited number of terms
had expired. Magleby points out that term
limits would essentially increase congressional
terms to the newly limited number of years
(1991). This would become the reality, he
contends, because most candidates will opt
to wait until their chances of winning are the
greatest--they will wait until the incumbent
is forced to retire so they can run for an open
seat. 12 Magleby further contends that term
limits would make the larger states even more
powerful in the House. One of Ornstein's best
arguments against term limits is that the power
of the members of Congress in general, not
just that of the small states, would be diminished, and the other branches of government
and the massive congressional support staff
would gain power proportionately (1991a).
While all of these assertions are
enough, by themselves, to cast doubt on the
viability of the call for congressional term
limits, I believe that there is an even better
argument against them: they are anti-democratic. George Will was only partially right
when he said that "incumbents are entrenched
by democratic choices" (Will 1991, 236). If
voters don't know what all of their choices
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are, democratic decisions are impossible.
Instead of limiting the choices of voters then,
moves should be made to expand them by
instilling competition in congressional races.
Recommendations

If term limits are not the answer to
solving the problems of incumbent domination,
we must tum elsewhere for a solution. As
Ornstein concludes, not only would tenn limits
"sock it to" incumbents, but they would sock
it to the rest of us too (l991a). The aim of
political science, in my estimation, is not to
merely understand politics, but to offer
solutions to problems that will better the
human condition.
My recommendation,
however, is nota "quick fix," but along term
solution that is in agreement with established
principles of American democracy and
republicanism. The real need lies in putting
competition back into congressional races.
One of the best ways to do this would be to
finance campaigns with public funds.
Most challengers never raise enough
money to break the threshold of visibility,
which is evidenced by the low number of
voters who were contacted by challengers and
who recognize their names. If the playing
field were to be leveled at least where fund
raising is concerned, challengers might fare
much better. Incumbents would still enjoy
numerous advantages, but there would be some
semblance of competition. In his aforementioned article on competitiveness in House
elections, Abramowitz presented a model
which simulated the 1984 House races as if
there were publicly financed elections. He
concluded that as many as forty-five incumbents could have been defeated (1991, 52).
The problem though, he points out, is that the
level of competition wasn't reached in his
model until each candidate was allotted
$800,000. Members of Congress would be
hard pressed to give that much money to any

one who decided to challenge them for their
seat. Furthermore, selling such an idea to the
tax-paying public would not be an easy task.
In light of these obstacles, Abramowitz
suggests a system of public financing where
candidates who can first raise $200,000 would
then be eligible for matching funds from a
public campaign pool, similar to the way
presidential elections are financed (52).
This idea may be far from perfect, but
it appears to be the best alternative. At the
same time, without other reforms, like a
balanced budget requirement for the national
government and some changes in the seniority
and committee systems of Congress, the impact
of public financing might be limited. Many
opponents of public financing further argue
that the scales would still be tipped heavily
in favor of incumbents. I agree. Public
financing alone will not solve all of the
problems this nation faces; however, it would
certainly be a step in the right direction.

NOTES

1. While there was an increase in the number of voluntary
retirements from the House during the 1970s, in the year
in which that decade saw the most retirements--there were
49 in 1978--there were still incumbents in 86 % of the
435 races. See Vital Statistics on Congress. 1991-1992,
pg.60.
2. When voters are asked to give the names of the
candidates running for office, they are often unable to.
However, when asked if they recognize the candidates'
names, they usually do. They can also then asses the
traits of each candidate.
3. Duke was an active neo-Nazi during the high school
and college years and was the grand wizard of the Ku
Klux Klan in 1975. He now asks voters to forget these
"tiresome references" to his past and accept him as a
candidate for low taxes and less government. (See the
November 18, 1991 edition of Newsweek.)
4. Since 1974, the number of pieces of franked mail has
doubled, and even tripled in given years. The highest
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number of-mailings was in 1984 when 924.6 million pieces
were franked at the cost of $117.3 million (Ornstein 1990,
139 and 160).

somewhere in between, into his model for determining
competitiveness and found that there was virtually no
difference in the resulting calculations.

5. Such tactics can amount to nothing if a representative
of senator takes an opposing position somewhere down
the road. Hatch did just that in the Clarence Thomas hearings and his favorable ratings among women dropped
overnight.

9. See Tod Lindberg's ·Putting Incumbents on Notice,·
in Insight, 8 October, 1990, p. 64.

6. Obviously, a scandal or revelation of improprieties
can quickly destroy any candi-date's image.

11. For a complete explanation of the Washington
proposal, see Timothy Egan, • Campaign on Term Limits
Breeds Unusual Alliances,· New York Times, 31 October
1991, AI.

7. Banks and Kiewiet define a weak candidate as one
with little or no prior political experience or exposure.
8.
Abramowitz later incorporated Congressional
Quarterly's 7 -point scale, in which congressional districts
are ranked as ·Safe Democrat,· ·Safe Republican,· or

10. The California measure was contested and subsequently upheld in the Supreme Court (Ornstein 1991a).

12. This argument is supported by the research of Banks
and Kiewiet. See page 22.
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The Dynamics of Negative Political Advertising:
History, Thematic Designs, and Effectiveness
by
Erik J. Bolinder

During the last decade, political observers have marked a trend in political advenising
toward more negative attacks on opponents. Many ofthese attacks have been criticized as untrue,
unfair, and sometimes unethical. Many journalists have staned analyzing the advenising campaigns
as much as the candidates themselves. Major newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and
Washington Post have devoted daily columns to the analysis of negative political advenisements
during a campaign. This repon examines the dynamics of negative political advenisements by
exploring their history, thematic designs, and effects on voting behavior. Although most political
expens agree that negative political advenisements may be an effective tool in winning votes for
the sponsor, the reverse, or the boomerang effect, is possible. This repon also demonstrates the
possibility of such an occurence by examining negative political campaigning in the 1990 race
for Congress in Utah's third congressional district.
Introduction
Throughout our nation's history ,
politicians have often engaged in negative
political campaigning. Even the respected and
highly revered George Washington was
attacked and distressed by stories that he was
a dolt, a thief, and a philanderer who offered
his beautiful slave woman to Mount Vernon's
VISItors. Upon winning the race for the
presidency and entering the White House,
Thomas Jefferson said, "I am the target of
every man's dirt" (Pfau and Kenski 1990, 5).
The emergence of newspapers in the
late 18th century--some owned and operated
by political party leaders themselves, and most
openly endorsing specific political views-fueled the development of negative political
campaigning. The newspapers became the
"voices of the political party that controlled
them " (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland 1991, 4).
Abraham Lincoln was attacked in his campaigns as an ape and depicted in political
cartoons as a clown and a fiend. During the
1884 presidential campaign, Grover Cleveland
survived vicious newspaper attacks and

political cartoons that claimed he fathered an
illegitimate child (Pfau and Kenski 1990, 5).
The development of electronic media
in the 20th century raised the level of negative
political advertising to a new high. Radio and
television opened up a new and larger audience
for candidates, especially on a national level.
As Pfau and Kenski point out, "those new
channels of communication were viewed as
more potent vehicles for political persuasion
and for transmitting negative messages" (1990,
6).
The first television campaign advertisements were aired during the 1952 presidential campaign.
A Madison Avenue
marketing consultant, Rosser Reeves, produced
commercials for Eisenhower and the Republican Party. Reeves, already well known for
his success in selling Anacin and M&M
chocolates through television commercials,
used the same principles that worked so well
for those products to sell Eisenhower as a
candidate. Reeves narrowed the campaign
to three major themes: the Korean War,
corruption, and rising taxes. Just as he stuck
to simple themes in his product commercials,

Bolinder 43
Reeves had Eisenhower recite simple statements centered around one of the three themes
for each commercial (Diamond and Bates
1988, 56).
During the early years of television,
few negative political advertisements were
featured. However, the Eisenhower campaign
aired one of the first: an antiwar statement.
"Two soldiers are pictured discussing the
meaningless [sic] of war on a Korean battlefield, and when one is suddenly killed, the
other futilely charges the enemy while an offcamera voice booms, 'vote Republican!'"
(Sabato 1981, 169). Negative advertisements
became far more institutionalized on television
during the 1964 presidential campaign:

the boomerang effect resulting from negative
political campaigns by examining the impact
of negative campaigning on the 1990 race for
congress in Utah's third congressional district.

Definitions
An understanding of the term "political
advertisement" in the context of this discussion
is important. A political advertisement may
be defined as a message supporting a candidate
or issue that has been paid for by the campaign
or supporters of the candidate or issue.
Political advertising generally falls into the
following four basic categories:
1.

It produced the most famous, and possibly the
most effective, negative political commercial
ever shown, a message that was so controversial
that the Johnson campaign pulled it after one
showing. The so-called 'daisy' spot...introduced
the sights and sounds of spring surrounding a
little girl picking flowers. It ends with a vivid
nuclear explosion as President Johnson intones
off camera about the stakes in the presidential
election (pfau and Kenski 1990, 7).

Today, negative political advertising
has become commonplace among local, state,
and federal campaigns. Estimating that a third
of all television spot commercials in recent
campaigns have been negative, Sabato says
increased negative advertising is the single
most obvious trend in campaign communication
(1981, 165). Over 450 million dollars were
spent in the 1986 House and Senate races and
over 50 percent of that amount was on negative
political advertising (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991, 3). To understand why this
proliferation of negative political advertisements is occurring, one must look at the
dynamics of today's negative political ads.
This report will discuss the thematic designs
and use of negative political advertisements,
examine the effectiveness of negative ads on
voting behavior, and study the possibility of

2.

3.

4.

Polispots - Television and radio commercials that run from 1 to 5 minutes
in length.
Newspaper Ads - These range from
tiny classified in rural weeklies to full
page displays in big city dailies.
Direct Mail - Mass mailings of computer generated letters carefully targeted to prospective voters.
Vertical Media - This is campaign
paraphernalia like bumper stickers,
buttons, yard signs, banners, key
chains (Young 1987,66).

Most of the research used in this report
focusses on the analysis of the first category:
polispots.
The term "negative political advertisement" should also be defined. Kaid and
Johnston offer an appropriate definition:
Negative ads and positive ads are generally
distinguished by their relative emphasis on the
sponsoring candidate and his or her opponent.
Negative ads focus on criticism of the opponent.
while positive ads focus on the 'good' characteristics, accomplishments, or issue positions
of the sponsoring candidate (Kaid and Johnston
1991, 53).
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Thematic Designs
The negative political advertisements
of today have increased in complexity and
sophistication from just three decades ago.
As shown in Table 1, Johnson-Cartee and
Copeland identify a number of standardizedthematic designs that have emerged in negative

political campaigns (1991, 72). Five overarching thematic designs are considered: being
your own worst enemy, the people against you,
transfer, us against them, and disparagement
humor. A variety of subcategories are also
listed.

Thematic Designs of Negative Advertisements
Being Your own worst Enemy
Your Ad in Their Negative spots
Your Political Gaffes
Your Political Experience
Your Political Character
Your Flip-Flops on the Issues
Your Past Promises and pitiful Performances
Your Voting Record (Actual Voting or Whether You Voted)
Your Choice for Vice President
Your Decision Not to Debate
The People Against You
The Voters Turn Against You
The Home constituency Turns Against You
The Party Faithful Reject You
Your Own Party Primary opponents Attack You
Transfer
Your comrades and Supporters
Events that Happened on Your Watch
Historical Comparisons
Paid Political Help
Os Against Them
The Cowboys vs. The Yankees
Us Against Foreigners
Class Warfare
The anti-Washington Mentality
Disparagement Humor
Source: Johnson-Cartee, Karen 5., and Gary A. Copeland. 1991. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
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Being Your Own Worst Enemy. Sometimes
political candidates become their own worst
enemies when their opponents use their past
performances or words against
them. A candidate's record, character, and
important decisions often become the targets
of attack. Even the lack of a past performance
becomes suspect. A candidate is sometimes
criticized for the fact that he or she has little
political experience for the office he or she
is seeking.

The People Against You. From time to time
almost every candidate will encounter a degree
of rejection from those perceived to be on the
same side of the fence--usually the same
political party or the same geographic area.
Attack statements made by opposing candidates
in the same party during primary campaigns
are often used against a candidate. Negative
statements may also be made by those living
in the same hometown or state as the candidate. An opposing candidate will sometimes
capitalize on this rejection and attempt to make
it look like even the opponent's closest allies
are turning against him or her.
Transfer. The character of a candidate's
supporters may sometimes be a liability. If
groups or individuals who are unpopular or
have unaccepted views support a specific
candidate, this fact may be used against that
candidate as an attack on the candidate's own
views or character. This technique is called
transfer. This approach may also be used to
tie the candidate to a negative event that
occurred during his or her term in office like
a depression, a war, or an outbreak of civil
unrest even though the candidate may not be
specifically responsible. Furthermore, if a
candidate resembles an unpopular personality
from our history, an historical comparison may
also be made.

Us Against Them. The us against them
approach may often be compared to the David
and Goliath story. A picture is often painted
of a candidate siding with an immense,
threatening bully from the outside. Perhaps
this is most often accomplished by painting
the opponent as a Washington insider with big
bucks who cares more about his or her status
inside the beltway rather than the welfare of
the people back home. This approach sometimes pits the working class against the upper
class or rural folks against "city slickers."
In industrialized areas like Michigan or Ohio,
candidates have used their opponents' relationships with foreign industrialized countries like
Japan as a threat to their own security and
well-being. The us against them approach
always depicts one candidate as the home team
(and often the underdog) and the opposing
candidate as the outsider.
Disparagement Humor. A candidate may
use humor to attack his or her opponent's
intelligence, voting record, or honesty.
Disparagement humor is defined as humor that
"disparages, belittles, debases, demeans,
humiliates, or otherwise victimizes" others
(Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991, 122).
Disparagement humor has a long history in
American politics stemming back to early
political cartoons depicting candidates with
exaggerated distinguishing physical characteristics. Research indicates that the most popular
strategy in negative ads appears to be humor
or ridicule (Kaid and Johnston 1991, 60) often
combined with another thematic design.
Usin& Ne&ative Advertisements
A basic understanding of how negative
political advertisements are designed leads to
two more important questions: when are they
used and who uses them the most? Kaid and
Johnston analyzed 830 television spots from
eight presidential campaigns to examine the
answers to these questions. Findings from

PSA Review 46

their study dispel some of the conceptions of
the use of negative advertisements.
Although many have charged that
negativism drastically increased during the
1988 election cycle, Kaid and Johnston found
that the level of negative advertisements in
1988 was the same as that of the two previous
years (1991, 57). As shown in Figure 1, the
1964 election year still holds the record for
the amount of televised negative advertisements. After that year, a steady increase over
time in negative advertising has taken place.

Kaid and Johnston also found that
neither incumbents nor challengers have a
monopoly on the use of negative political
advertisements (1991, 58). As shown in Figure 2, the use of negative political ads are very
similar between these two groups.
Sometimes one political party will
blame the other for excessively using negative
advertisements. Kaid and Johnston found that
no strong relationship exists between political
party and the use of negative ads (1991,58).
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As shown in Figure 3, Democrats have used
only slightly more negative political ads than
Republicans.
Kaid and Johnston also studied the
difference between the appeals of negative and
positive advertisements (1991, 59). They
found that, contrary to critical opinion,
negative ads did not rely much more on
emotional appeals than positive ads. As shown
in Table 2, emotional appeals were used in
89 percent of all negative ads and in 86 percent
of all positive ads. Additionally,

negative ads contained logical appeals more
often than positive ads, but positive ads were
more likely than negative ads to use ethical
appeals.
The Effectiveness of Negative Ads
Determining the effectiveness of
negative political advertising on voting
behavior is hindered by the limitations of
studying the effects of political advertising

Figure 2
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in general. Because so much simultaneous
activity occurs during a campaign, it has been
difficult to isolate the effectiveness of one
specific activity like political advertising. The
effectiveness of political advertising on
television is still largely undetermined:
Kay Israel did a 1983 study of the existing
academic literature on political advertising and
found little that went beyond the standard
textbook conclusion offered by Bernard Berelson
of the University of Chicago in the pre-

television 1940s. Berelson wrote that 'some kinds of
communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the
attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of
conditions, have some kinds of effects.' For this cautious
adagio we are tempted to say to Berelson, 'Thanks a little'
(Diamond and Bates 1988, 351).

More conclusive research suggests that
people pay attention principally to messages
that reflect their preexisting views (Diamond
and Bates 1988, 351). For example, those
who have already chosen to vote for Bush are
the most attentive audience for Bush campaign
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ads. Conversely, those who oppose Bush are
less attentive to a Bush ad or will listen to the
ad, argue with it in their minds, and then reject
it.
In the case of political campaigns, the
"some kind of people" (as previously mentioned by Diamond and Bates) the experts say
they are trying to reach are those who are not
highly partisan or who have not decided on
a candidate:

partisan individuals are best reached by direct mail or
limited circulation print advertising, whereas television
ads are most effective with the body of the U.S. electorate
who are not partisan and are thus persuadable (Kern 1989,
6).

Perhaps politicians are addicted to using
television advertising in campaigns because
it enables them to reach thousands and even
millions more people than they otherwise
could. But why use negative messages? As
Ehrenhalt indicates, although the effectiveness
of political advertising in general is still

Campaign specialists function on the basis of
their research, which suggests that highly

TABLE 2
Appeals in Positive and Negative Televised Ads for Presidential Campaigns, 1960-1988
Positive Ads
(n=588)
Appeals Used
Logical
Emotional
Ethical

n
391
507
438

%
66
86
74

Negative Ads
(n = 242)
n
175
215
135

%
72
89
56

Source: Lynda L. Kaid and Anne Johnston. 1991. "Negative Versus Positive Advertising in U.S. Presidential
Campaigns: 1960-1988. Journal of Communication 41 (Summer): 53-64.
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in question, most experts agree that negative
messages are more influential than positive
messages:
While there is room for argument about whether
negative ads will damage the political system
in the long term, there is no argument about their
short-term impact, they work and they win
elections. Voters pay attention to them (Ehrenhalt 1985, 2560).

Democratic pollster, Mark Mellman
explains the success of negative political ads
as follows:
One of the fundamental facts of psychology is
that negative information is processed more
deeply than positive information. People say
they hate the stuff, but that's not the point. The
point is, they absorb the information (cited in
Pfau and Kenski 1990, 3).

The sophistication of both the thematic
designs and the technology itself has added
to the effectiveness of negative ads:
More politicians, including incumbents, are
inclined to use negative and comparative message
strategies, partly because they know that some
consultants can demonstrate which messages
work and which don't, and partly because they
know that their opponent has the same strategic
opportunity and technology at his or her disposal
(pfau and Kenski 1990, 4).

The conclusion that negative political
advertising is more effective than positive
political advertising is rarely argued. However, negative ads could still have undesired
effects. Using negative advertising strategies
could be a "damned if you do and damned if
you don't" situation.
The Boomeran& Effect
One of the undesired effects of negative
political advertising that has been researched
and documented is the boomerang effect:

Negative political advertising may achieve its
intended effects, but it may also produce
boomerang effects. A strong attack on a
candidate, if perceived by the audience as
untruthful, undocumented, or in any way
unjustified, may create more negative feelings
toward the sponsor, rather than toward the target
(Garramore 1984, 251).

The 1990 race for Congress in Utah's
third congressional district may provide an
example of the boomerang effect. Since its
creation in the early 1980s, the third congressional district has maintained the reputation
of being one of the "nation's most Republican
congressional districts" (Barone and Ujifusa
1991, 1253). Election results from the past
decade substantiate that reputation. As shown
in Table 3, voters from Utah's third congressional district voted overwhelmingly in favor
of Republican Ronald Reagan over Democrat
Walter Mondale in the 1984 presidential
election and in favor of Republican George
Bush over Democrat Michael Dukakis in the
1988 presidential election (Barone and Ujifusa
1987, 1207; 1989, 1233).
Results of the past four congressional
elections prior to 1990 also show a heavy
domination by the Republican party. As
shown in Table 4, the smallest margin of
victory between Republicans and Democrats
in these races occurred in 1986 when Republican Howard Nielson received 67 percent
of the vote and Democrat Dale Gardiner
received 33 percent of the vote (Barone and
Ujifusa 1987, 1208). Nielson received 77
percent of the vote in 1982 and 75 percent of
the vote in 1984 (Barone and Ujifusa 1985,
1363). In 1988, Nielson received 67 percent
of the vote while his opponent, Democrat
Robert Stringham, received only 31 percent
of the vote. Election results like these led
experts to believe that the congressman elected
in 1990 to replace retiring Nielson would
"surely be chosen in the 1990 Republican
primary" (Barone and Ujifusa 1989, 1233).
Why then were the results so completely
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different in the 1990 race for Utah's third
congressional seat? Democrat Bill Orton beat
Republican Karl Snow by almost as large a
margin as the Republicans have been beating
the Democrats--Orton received 58 percent of
the vote while Snow only received 36 percent.
These results may be linked to the negativity
of the campaign.
Polls conducted by Bardsley and
Neidhardt Incorporated (of 300 registered
voters, margin of error + /- 5.7 %) and

reported in the Salt Lake Tribune November
4, 1990 showed Snow leading Orton in
September by 43 to 31 percent with 26 percent
undecided. By the middle of October, Snow
still led by 50 to 35 percent with 12 percent
undecided. But, by the first day of November
Snow's lead shrunk to 44 percent over 38
percent for Orton with 14 percent undecided--a
race too close to call.

TABLE 3
Vote for President in Utah's Third Congressional District
By Candidate's Political Party (General Election)

Party

Republican
Democratic

1984 Vote

1988 Vote

n

%

n

%

153,584
43,293

77
22

140,110
60,118

69
29

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1985. The
almanac of American politics: 1986. Washington D.C.: National Journal.
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The race was characterized as by far the most
negative campaign in the history of the district
and perhaps the most negative in the history
of Utah politics. Most attacks between Snow
and Orton occurred during October:
Neither candidate will emerge from the campaign
unwounded. Orton was questioned about tax
penalties he owed on a vehicle he brought to
Utah from Oregon years ago. Snow has been
plagued with allegations about

the depth of his involvement with penny-stock swindler
Michael Strand (Adams 1990, lB).

Despite the negative campaigning and
the fact that Snow's lead was dwindling, local
analysts still predicted the usual Republican
victory:
Snow [will winJ--not by an avalanche--but
comfortably, and Orton's political career is over
almost before it began. Scandal aside, it is the
most Republican district in the nation (Lythgoe
1990, IE).

TABLE 4
Utah's Third Congressional District Campaign Election Results 1982-1988
Election

Candidate

n

%

1982 general

Howard Nielson (R)
Henry Huish (D)

108,478
32,661

77
23

1984 general

Howard Nielson (R)
Bruce Baird (D)

138,918
46,560

75
25

1986 general

Howard Nielson (R)
Dale Gardiner (D)

86,599
42,582

67
33

1988 general

Howard Nielson (R)
Robert Stringham (D)

129,951
60,018

67
31

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac ofAmerican Politics: 1988.
Washington D.C.: National Journal.
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During the last days of the campaign-two days before the election--supporters of
Snow added more fuel to the campaign's
negative fire. They placed an ad in the Utah
County J oumal showing a picture of Karl
Snow with his large family next to a picture
of Orton, who is single. Captions under the
respective pictures read "Karl Snow and his
Family" and "Bill Orton and His Family."
Some experts say Snow was "hurt" by the
placement of the ad (Barone and Ujifusa 1991,
1253). Orton himself said the ad backfired
on Snow:

People called saying they could not vote
Republican after seeing that ad. I think it was
a miscalculation on their part. They thought
that would destroy my campaign by alienating
me from the voters. It didn't work (Sait Lake
Tribune 1990, 2A).

That advertisement, along with the
negative nature of the campaign from the
beginning, may have led would-be Republican
voters to abandon their party loyalty and vote
for Orton.
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A comparison of the results in the 1990
third congressional elections to all the other
elections in the district's history alone would
seem to indicate the strength of the boomerang
hypothesis. However, an analysis of voters
who voted in the primary and general election
prove its existence even more solidly. As
shown in Figure 4, the 1990 KBYU/Utah
Colleges Exit Poll indicates that a large
percentage of those who say their vote was
a vote against the opponent voted for Orton.
Conversely, a much smaller percentage of
those who voted for Snow said their vote was
a vote against Orton .

The fact that 74 percent of those casting
protest votes--a vote against the opponent-were for Orton and against Snow indicates
a strong disapproval of Snow as a candidate.
There was also a substantial amount
of defections among those who voted for the
two Republican front runners (Snow and
Harmer) in the Republican primary election.
As shown in Figure 5, the 1990 KBYU/Utah
Colleges Exit Poll indicates that 33 percent
of those who voted for Karl Snow in the
primary voted for Orton in the general election
and 68 percent of those who voted
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for John Harmer in the primary voted for
Orton in the general election.
Although it may be difficult to show
a direct causal relationship between the Snow
family ad and the outcome of the general
election in the third congressional district, the
race has been characterized by two distinct
descriptions: the amount of negative campaigning was far greater than ever before and
the results were completely different than ever
before. Polls conducted before the placement
of the Snow family ad made no indication of
a landslide victory for Orton. The negative
tone of the campaign together with the Snow
family ad could have had the most effect on
those in the category of "undecided" in the
polls prior to election day and those who's
decisions were not solid.
A relationship does appear to exist
between the negative campaign in the third
district and the vote against Karl Snow.
However, too many limitations also exist to
use the race as definitive proof of the boomerang theory of negative political advertising.
Several other independent variables may have
affected the outcome of the election: the
negative tone of the Republican primary,
Republican party infighting, the personalities
of the two candidates, the platforms of the two
candidates, and the conservative views of
Orton despite his partisanship. Direct empirical research of voter reaction to negative
advertisements would need to be conducted
to prove the boomerang theory.
The timing of the Snow family ad could
also have been a big factor in the outcome of
the election. Based on their observations,
some professional consultants suggest the
following:

a wave of negative ads/ frequently reduces the
attacker's poll standing a few points. But those
numbers nearly always bounce back within a
few days. Meanwhile, the target of the attack
loses considerably more support--and that slippage lasts much longer (Johnson-Cartee and
Copeland 1991, 14).
,

There were not a "few days" to make up for
what may have been lost ground from the
placement of the Snow family ad.
Conclusions
Although their use has changed over
the course of our history, negative political
advertisements have always been a part of our
political system. This will probably remain
true in the future. The craft of developing
negative political advertisements--with their
many thematic designs and strategies--has
evolved into somewhat of a science. However,
determining the true effects of negative
political advertisements--or political advertisements in general--is still the greatest challenge
to political practitioners and communication
researchers.
Experts do agree that when it comes
to basic messages, which is the goal of most
political advertisements, a negative message
is usually remembered more than a positive
message. So as long as politicians feel the need
to advertise their candidacy, the use of
negative political advertisements will continue
and perhaps escalate. But, negative ads will
sometimes cause negative effects. What the
sponsor says about the opposing candidate,
if it is perceived to be untruthful or unfair,
could backfire on his or her own success in
a campaign.
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National Rifle Association
vs
House of Representatives and Public Opinion:
A Case Study in Interest Group Power
by
Doug Goodman

Single-issue interest groups can be a concern in the United States. At times they represent
the interest of a minority of the population. The National Rifle Association is one such group.
The NRA opposes any type of gun-control legislation, even if the legislation is supponed by a
majority of the population. In September 1988, the House of Representatives defeated a popular
guncontrol amendment to the Omnibus-drug Bill. At the time the House defeated this amendment,
public opinion was strongly in favor of it. This paper is a case study of the power of interest
groups. Specifically, the topic is how the National Rifle Association's powerful lobbying effons
against the Brady amendment caused its defeat.
NRA vs. the House of Representatives and
Public Opinion
The two major political parties in the
United States work to influence public policy.
However, they are becoming weaker and
weaker as time passes and interest groups are
filling the void. Allan Cigler and Burdett
Loomis argue: "The weakness of political
parties has helped to create a vacuum in
electoral politics since 1960, and in recent
years interest groups have moved aggressively
to fill it" (1991, 20).
In 1988, the National Rifle Association
(NRA) exerted its power in Congress. They
lobbied against a popular gun-control measure,
the Brady amendment, which was attached
to the Omnibus-drug Bill (drug bill). The
amendment would have established a mandatory seven-day waiting period before the purchase of a handgun. The National Rifle
Association's powerful lobbying efforts against
the Brady amendment caused its defeat.

Interest Groups
Mancur Olson, Jr. addresses the subject
of interest groups by saying, "group interests

and group behavior are the primary forces in
. . . political behavior." Olson continues,
"group interests rather than individual interest
seem to be the fundamental force in lawmaking" (1968, 118). This is evident not only
in the defeat of the Brady amendment, but the
defeat and passage of many bills on Capitol
Hill.
The National Rifle Association is an interest
group or pressure group. According to well
known political scientist, David B. Truman,
an interest group is:
Any group that, on the basis of one or more
shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other
groups in the society for the establishment,
maintenance, or enhancement of forms of
behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes
(1955, 33).

In 1787, one of the framers of th,
Constitution of the United States, James
Madison, also defined pressure groups. He
called them factions. Madison could see the
dangers that factions or special interest groups
could have on people and governments. In
Federalist, No. 10, Madison defines factions
as:
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A number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse
of passion , or of interest, adverse to the nOghts
of the other dtizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community (1987,
46, emphasis added).

National Rifle Association
In his book, Interest Groups in the
United States, Graham Wilson describes the
National Rifle Association as conceivably the
most powerful single-issue interest group in
America. The NRA has successfully stopped
"any effective gun control." Even with the
assassination attempt on President Reagan and
the assassinations of the Kennedy brothers and
Martin Luther King, there are hardly any
federal regulations controlling the purchase
or use of guns (1981, 104). The NRA is the
primary reason for the lack of effective gun
laws.
The National Rifle Association, with
its 2.8 million members, is a special interest
group or pressure group that seeks to promote
Americans' right to bear arms. According
to Wilson, roughly 25 percent of the NRA's
members do not even shoot guns. They join
because they support the right to bear arms
(1981, 105). One tactic the NRA uses well
is that they try to represent every proposed
limitation on firearms as an assault on the right
to bear arms (Cigler and Loomis 1991, 391).

Gun Control
In 1791, Americans added the Bill of
Rights to the Constitution. Included in the
Bill of Rights is the second amendment. This
amendment, some argue, guarantees the
citizens' right to bear arms. Detroit Police
Chief, William L. Hart, explains that this
amendment to the Constitution was important,
because in 1791 there were no police departments and many people had to hunt for their

own food. Today, however, police departments are in virtually every town and people
do not have to hunt for their food because of
the accessibility of grocery stores. Chief Hart
infers that because of this, there are no longer
compelling reasons to guarantee the right to
bear arms (1988, 32).
Crime rate in the United States is high.
Each year thousands of people are victims of
violent crimes resulting from handguns.
According to the Uniform Crime Reports,
since 1980, violent crime has risen by 11
incidents per 100,000 inhabitants (U.S.
Department of Justice 1990,48). During the
four years between 1985 and 1989, the
homicide rate in the United States has risen
by 10 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants.
During the same four years, there were almost
92,000 homicides, and 45 percent of those
homicides occurred with handguns (9).
Handgun usage occurs not only in homicides,
but also in assaults, robberies, and suicides.
Handgun use also injures and kills thousands
of people accidentally each year.
Charles Orasin, President of Handgun
Control, Inc., compares the United States to
other countries and shows the high homicide
numbers in the United States as compared to
other countries. He compares New York City
to London, both having a population of about
7 million people. In 1986, there were 1,582
homicides in New York City, compared to
sixty-seven in London. He also compares the
number of homicides in Chicago to the number
of homicides in Toronto, in 1985. During
that year, there were 666 homicides in Chicago
compared to sixty-one in Toronto. Orasin
continues by saying:
Data compiled from foreign nations for 1983
shows that handguns were used to murder 35
people in Japan, 8 in Great Britain, 27 in
Switzerland, 6 in Canada, 7 in Sweden, lOin
Austria, and 9,014 in America (1988, 13).
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There is a large difference between the
number of homicides in the United States and
the number in other countries. There must
be a reason for the discrepancies in cities with
the same population base. Professors Sproule
and Kennett give a partial explanation for the
high homicide rate in the United States. In
their article, they compare homicide rates in
Canada, which has strict handgun laws, to
homicide rates in the United States, which does
not have strict handgun laws. Their evidence
overwhelmingly illustrates that handgun control
does reduce homicide rates (1989, 245-51).
Defeat of the Brady Amendment
On June 30, 1988, the House Judiciary
Committee approved a controversial handgun
provision. The amendment calls for a seven-day waiting period before the purchase of a
handgun (Lawrence 1988, 1839). This
amendment is called the "'Brady amendment, '
after James S. Brady, White House press
secretary wounded in the 1981 assassination
attempt on the President" (1840).
The attachment of the Brady amendment to the drug bill concerned the NRA.
Wayne LaPierre, executive director of the
NRA's Institute for Legislative Action (ILA) ,
commented on the Brady amendment by saying
that the bill "is a maJor issue." LaPierre
added, "It's the federal government imposing
its views on the states" (1839).
Nadine Cohadas reported in an article
that the gun-lobby, mainly the National Rifle
Association and Gun Owners of America,
geared up for plans to strike the seven- day
waiting period from the drug bill (1988, 1904).
Defeating the Brady amendment was the major
priority of the NRA. The NRA would spend
millions of dollars and mobilize thousands of
faithful letter writing members to defeat the
Brady amendment. In his essay, Paul Johnson
says that the NRA has the resources to lobby
strongl y against the amendment. In 1987, the

NRA's Institute for Legislative Action--its
congressional lobyy group--spent $9.6 million
or 15 percent of the total NRA' s expenditures
(1991, 42).
The NRA uses its magazines, American
Rifleman and American Hunter, to get the
word out to its members and to start its
campaign against the Brady amendment. In
1988, the AmeriCan Rifleman, alone, claimed
a circulation of about 1.4 million readers
(National Rifle Association 1988, 95).
As part of the NRA' s strategy, in the
August 1988 issue of American Rifleman it
attacked two similar bills. The targets were
Senate bill S.466 and House bill H.R.975, also
known as the Metzenbaum/Feighan bill
(National Rifle Association 1988,56). These
two bills were the forerunners to the Brady
amendment; their content and language were
similar to that of the Brady amendment. The
attack on these two bills leaves the reader to
believe that they and the Brady amendment
are one in the same. The NRA even refers
to the Brady amendment in its magazines as
the Metzenbaum/Feighan/Brady amendment
(1988, 56).
In its articles and advertisements, the
NRA exaggerated the contents of the Brady
amendment. The NRA' s article mentioned
the Brady amendment to the drug bill, but
mingled parts of S.466 and H.R.975 with it.
The NRA reports:
Proponents of the "waiting period" provision
say states that already have "waiting periods"
or permit systems are exempt; however, the bill
would require duplication. New Yorkers who
need permission from a judge, for example
would also need permission from a local police
chiefwith a seven-day wait. S.466 and H.R.975
as introduced (unlike the Feighan amendment
to the drug bill ... ) would apply not just to
dealer transfers but also to private transfers-including gifts from parents to children-giving local
law enforcement the power to decide whether
to disapprove the transfer. These bills would
put the government in the middle of every
handgun transfer in America. And there would
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be no right of appeal, no legal redress in federal
law for arbitrary or illegal denial. (National Rit1e
Association 1988, 56)

In this article, the NRA gave the
im~~ession ~hat in addition to the seven-day
waItmg penod and background check on
potential handgun buyers, the Brady amendment would call for a waiting period on all
gun transfers and a national gun registration.
To illustrate this point, the NRA placed a full
page advertisement calling for the stop of "the
waiting period gun registration scam" (National
Rifle Association 1988, 56-7).
In 1989, the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) analyzed the NRA. The CRS
received complaints about the NRA misstating
the facts about gun-control legislation. The
NRA tried to lead gun-owners into. thinking
the government would confiscate their guns
(Biskupic 1989, 3313).
In response to the attack on the NRA' s
advertisements and articles, Wayne LaPierre
justified the NRA's actions because of the wide
scope oflegislation, proposals and amendments
each bill. faces. The NRA "collectively
charactenzes the 'types' of bills that might
come up." LaPierre continues by saying that
the NRA does not use bill numbers in its
advertisements. He also says that they make
them as accurate as they can, "given that those
bills change. And we don't know what kind
of floor amendments we have to face" (3313).
Besides the advertisements and articles
in magazines, Biskupic says that the NRA
astounds lawmakers on both sides of the
gun-control issue by mobilizing its grass-root
membership (3313). Representative William
J. Hughes (D-NJ), describes the NRA as: "A
l~bb~ that c~ put 15,000 letters in your
dlstnct overnIght and have people in your
townhall meetings interrupting you" (3313).
Ronald Hrebenar and Ruth Scott say that the
NRA can "generate a half million letters to
Congress within three days" (1990, 103).

The NRA, through its numerous
mailings, vocalized the interests of anti-gun
control advocates in congressional districts.
Ar~sas Representative Beryle Anthony, Jr.,
ChaIrman of theDemocratic Campaign
Committee, said that many members of the
House wanted to vote against the NRA but
did not because of "the unpleasantness to
which the member would be entertained back
home" (Berke 1988, A32).
. In his essay, Paul Johnson says that
dunng the fight against the Brady amendment,
the NRA more than doubled its political
expenditures (1991, 39). An article in the
New York Times, by Richard Berke, says that
the NRA out-spent the largest gun-control
lobby by more than a seven to one margin.
Berke also reports that the NRA spent nearly
$3 million to defeat the Brady amendment.
This cost included mailing three letters to each
of its 2.8 million members pleading with them
to contact their representatives and urge them
to vote against the Brady amendment (1988,
A32). This illustrates the determination the
NRA has to promote its single-interest policy
of the right to bear arms.
Michael Isikoff, a reporter for the
Washin~ton Post, reported on the letter sent
to NRA members in opposition to the Brady
amendment. In the letter, the NRA said: "If
this measure becomes law, government
bureaucrats twill spend millions and billions
of your tax dollars investigating you and other
honest citizens. '" The letter continued, saying
that those who sponsor the bill, "want the
police to visit your home before you can buy
a firearm" (1988, A2). A letter like this , no
matter how much it is exaggerated, excites
people against the legislation. In turn, they
contact their representatives speaking out
against the Brady amendment.
The NRA targeted others besides its
members in its fight against the Brady amendment. The article says that in addition to
the NRA's mailing three letters to its nearly
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3 million member organization, it also targeted
20 members of the House using radio advertisements to get their support (A2).
Richard Berke reports, in contrast to
the large amount of money spent by the NRA,
Handgun-Control, Inc. (HCI) , the main
gun-controllobby, spent $250,000 to promote
the Brady amendment. Most of the money
paid for newspaper advertisements (A32).
Furthermore, the NRA, in its magazines,
publicized news conferences and interviews
with police officers speaking out against the
Brady amendment (National Rifle Association
1988, 58). This shows a split in the weak
coalition between HCI and various police
organizations.
Ccongressional campaign contributions
can also have an effect on the way members
of Congress vote. The National Rifle Association's Political Action Committee (PAC),
called the NRA Political Victory Fund
(NRA-PVF), contributed to congressional
campaigns during 1988. The NRA reports,
11[i]n the 1988 general elections, the NRA-PVF spent an estimated $3.9 million for
communication with members, directcampaign
donations or for independent campaign
expenditures." The NRA-PVF was directly
involved with 1,360 campaigns in 1988 (1990,
1). According to Fred Wertheimer, president
of Common Cause, PACs create "an obligation
for our elected officials to serve PAC interest,
first and foremost" (1983, 43). There is no
doubt that NRA-PVF contributions influenced
some members of Congress to vote for the
NRA.
After all of the money and hours spent
by both sides of the gun-control issue, the
Brady amendment finally reached the House
floor for debate and action. Christine Lawrence reports that the Rules Committee allowed
a rule considering an amendment to the
Omnibus-drug Bill by Representative Bill
McCollum (R-FL). The amendment would
be the same one that failed in the House

Judiciary Committee in July. It would strike
the seven-day waiting period and appoint the
Attorney General to develop a system to check
for felons trying to buy handguns (1988,
2290).
The Washington Post reports that the
McCollum amendment split the Democratic
leadership in the House. House Majority
Leader, Thomas Foley (D-WA), and Democratic Whip, Tony Coelho (D-CA), both
supported the amendment and voted with the
NRA (Isikoff 1988, A2). With the leadership
voting with the NRA many democrats also
favored the initiative.
On September 15, 1988, the McCollum
amendment came to the House floor for a vote.
The Con~ressional Ouarterly Weekly Rca><>rt
reported that the House adopted the McCollum
amendment 228-182 to strike the Brady
amendment and seven-day waiting period from
the Omnibus-<irug bill (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1988, 2620).
After the defeat of the Brady amendment on the floor, Cohadas reported the
following, "[Representative Edward] Feighan
and Sarah Brady sought to find a silver lining
in their defeat. " They pointed out that the vote
on the McCollum Amendment illustrates a
strong concern for background checks before
the purchase of a handgun (1988, 2565).
According to national polls, there was
more than just a strong concern for background
checks. Most of the nation favored the
seven-day waiting period at the time of the
vote. A Gallup Poll survey taken after the
defeat of the Brady amendment, shows that
at the time 91 percent of the population
favored the seven-day waiting period (Gallup
and Newport 1990, 34). This illustrates that
the members of the House of Representatives
gave in to the pressures of special interest
groups, rather then representing their constituents.
Hazel Erskine says, "It is difficult to
imagine any other issue on which Congress
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has been less responsive to public sentiment
for a longer period of time (1972,456). She
continues by saying that Congress has not been
a leader in gun-control or even followed public
opinion. Since the beginning of modem polls,
in 1938, no fewer than two-thirds of the
nation's population favored gun-control or
some type of supervision (455).
Though most Americans favor the
seven-day waiting period, Congress will not
pass it. Carol Greenwald describes why
Congress is afraid of passing gun-control
legislation:
II

The strength of potential electoral influence is
revealed in the gun control paradox: over
two-thirds of all Americans favor gun control
legislation, but it never passes Congress because
[of) the National Rifle Association [and) its
electoral power. "Elected officials sense that
the anticontrol voters mobilized by the gun lobby
are apt to engage in a kind of bullet voting, and
deciding their voting preferences on the basis
of the gun question alone" (1977, 63).

Along those same lines, Representative
Tom Tauke (RIA), addresses the NRA's
campaign contributions and its grass-roots
mobilizing techniques by saying, "I think a
member recognizes that a $1,000 contribution
is not going to make much of a difference in
the outcome of a political race." Tauke
continues, "But if 5 ,000 people are mobilized
in opposition, that can obviously be a threat
to re-election" (Berke 1988, A32).
Finally, the NRA used timing and the
election season to defeat the Brady amendment.
Charles Mack writes about how satisfying a
legislator's constituency is most important in
getting re-elected. However, this usually
means going along with the opinions of a few
well organized, active, and vocal groups. He
illustrates this by saying:
The public at large mayor may not share the
views of the National Rifle Association, for
instance, but it will not be a tenth as expressive

about gun control as are local gun owner (1989,
123)

With election Tuesday less that two months
away, a representative would rather not deal
with a few angry vocal constituents.
According to Graham Wilson, there
are 60 million gun owners in America. Their
votes are more of a deterrent to guncontrol
legislation than that of the NRA (1981, 105).
However, recent polls show that an overwhelming majority of gun owners favor stricter
gun-control legislation. 78 percent of those
polled favored registration (Gallup 1990,38).
It would seem to follow that most gun owners
would favor a seven day waiting period. If
the majority of the people are in favor of stricter handgun control, Congress should follow
suit.
Conclusion
At times, special interest groups
pressure Congress into making policy against
public opinion as the NRA did with the Brady
amendment. However, this policy making
under pressure from special interest groups
could be a detriment to society as Senator
Hugo Black says:
Contrary to tradition, against the public morals,
and hostile to good government, the lobby has
reached such a position of power that it threatens
government itself. It size, its power, its capacity
for evil, its greed, trickery, deception and fraud
condemn it to the death it deserves (Cigler and
Loomis 1991, 3).

Money spent by the NRA gained them
their victory. Michael Isikoff sums it up by
saying that at the defeat of the Brady amendment, the NRA re-established itself as one of
the most feared and powerful lobbies in
Washington. The NRA campaign against the
Brady amendment cost them millions of dollars
plus the nearly 10 million letters mailed
nationwide. The lobby campaign overwhelmed

I
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the coalition of gun-control advocates and
police (1988, A2). The case of the NRA
illustrates that interest groups playa major

role in formulating public policy. Sometimes,
as in this case, the policy was overwhelmingly
against public opinion.
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Soviet Third World Policy Dilemmas and
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict

by
Deven Ogden

The recent resolution of the Cambodian problems that have lingered since after World
War II are generally looked on as the product of American and Chinese action. However, Soviet
policy also had a significant impact on recent developments. By encouraging Vietnamese withdrawl
from Cambodia and by dramatically reducing foreign aid to Cambodia, the Soviet Union was
able to exert influence on Cambodia to settle the deeply rooted problems of the country.

For decades Cambodia has been the
cold war battleground of the Soviet Union,
China, and the United States who have been
the advocates of the various Cambodian
contingents. Vietnam, one of the Soviet's most
dependent clients, invaded Cambodia in the
last weeks of 1978, ousting the genocidal
Khmer Rouge from power . Yet, supported
by the Chinese, the Khmer Rouge were able
to maintain a significant resistance force to
fight a civil war that has only recently come
to a cease-fire. To complicate matters, the
US revived two non-communist Cambodian
resistance factions in protest to the Vietnamese
invasion. In 1982, these two factions--Ied by
Prince Sihanouk, former head of state of
Cambodia during the 1950s and 60s, and Son
Sann, Sihanouk's fonner prime minister-joined
with the Khmer Rouge in the resistance effort
against the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin
regime.
The Cambodian civil war raged on for
years until finally, in 1989, Vietnam surprised
the world by announcing that it would withdraw all its troops from Cambodia by 1990.
In fact, it was in September of 1989 that Hanoi
claimed that all its troops had indeed withdrawn. What Vietnam had been to the US
in 1973 when the US withdrew its troops,
Cambodia was to Vietnam in 1989--Cambodia

was Vietnam's "Vietnam." Since the withdrawal, the parties have made significant
progress toward a comprehensive peace
settlement in the region. All four factions have
agreed to an enhanced UN involvement in the
settlement. The United Nations will play an
unprecedented role as it will dismantle the
Phnom Penh government and replace the
bureaucracy with its own personnel and
peacekeeping troops until UN-supervised
elections democratically empower a new
neutral government.
When the UN first proposed its
comprehensive settlement, the Hun Sen
government in Phnom Penh strongly opposed
it as it highly disadvantaged his government.
As late as December 1990, Hun Sen expressed
his contempt for such an imbalanced plan:
The Prime Minister said that his government
will never consent to the presence in Cambodia
of a large UN peacekeeping force and will not
agree to replacing the present administration with
a "UN transitional authority,· much less to
dissolving the legitimately functioning current
government before elections are held, which is
essentially what the opposition is seeking
(Vinogradov 1990).

Hun Sen continued to make such protests
throughout the various negotiations in 1991.

,
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Yet on October 23, Hun Sen signed the peace
treaty that set into action the very operations
he vowed he would never consent to.
Several explanations have been given
why Vietnam decided to unilaterally withdraw
its troops and why Phnom Penh conceded to
the UN operation. Most of the analyses focus
on the US and Chinese involvement in the
crisis and the effects of their foreign policy.
US and Chinese policies focused on isolating
Vietnam and Cambodia politically and
economically and supporting the resistance
forces in an attempt to compel Vietnamese
withdrawal and compromise in peace negotiations. However, most of these studies pay
little attention to the significant role played
by the Soviets in influencing Vietnam to
undertake an Afghanistan-like withdrawal.
While the resistance movement and the
isolation and pressure imposed by the US and
China have certainly been major factors
bringing about the Vietnamese withdrawal and
the resulting peace process, they are not the
only factors. The Soviet's role in influencing
the Vietnamese withdrawal and Phnom Penh's
cooperation in the peace process will be the
focus of this study as a contributing explanation.
Many fmd it unthinkable to believe that
the Soviet Union would undermine its own
client state by encouraging it to cooperate in
a peace settlement that would almost certainly
eliminate it froin power or at least diminish
its power profoundly. However, considering
the political, economic, and social changes
that have had such a profound impact on the
Soviet Union since 1985, a dramatic change
in its foreign policy can also be expected.
In fact, the Soviet Union had been experiencing severe dilem mas in the Third World for
some time. Gorbachev is responsible for many
policy reforms which were undertaken to deal
with these dilemmas which fall into two
categories: economic and political.

The chronic economic decline in the
Soviet Union has affected its foreign policy
in that the Soviets can no longer afford to
sustain the massive foreign aid programs it
had once implemented in the Third World:
The Soviets had learned that counterinsurgency
problems in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and
Nicaragua exacerbated risks of getting in vol ved
in a client state, meant sinking excessive
investments into unsteady political systems, andconsequently--worsened economic problems
within the world socialist system (Goodman
1991,52).

Gorbachev formally recognized the problem
with his government's foreign aid program
by issuing a decree on July 24, 1990 mandating major foreign aid reforms. Though
the Vietnamese withdrawal had already taken
place by the time Soviet aid was cut, it had
been foreseen for some time and had been a
considerable threat for Vietnam and Cambodia
to depend solely on the Soviet Union. It
became clear that they would have to bring
about political and economic changes that
would allow them to integrate with the free
market economies of the world. Vietnam's
occupation of Cambodia and the continuing
factional stalemate was, of course, a major
obstacle to this objective.
Politically, the
Soviet Union had suffered greatly in Asia and
elsewhere for Vietnam's occupation of
Cambodia. The conflict threatened to increase
a US presence in the region, strengthened
Sino-US ties, and eliminated any chances for
improved relations with ASEAN, the US. and
China. The entire political environment was
very dismal for the USSR's broader strategic
objectives:
The Soviets found themselves at a disadvanw~~
in Asia as China normalized relations with th~
United States and Iapan ... The USSR, for th~
most part, was excluded from the diplomatl(
activity and burgeoning economic development
of the region, perceived by Asian states as d
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European power with threatening military assets
in the Pacific (Goodman 1991, 107-8)

It is the economic and political disadvantages that provided the incentives for the
Soviet ~ nion to take such a provocative policy
stance In pressuring Vietnam to withdraw and
allow a political settlement to take place in
Cambodia. The focus of this study will be
on these incentives and the impact they had
on Soviet policy, how that policy was implemented toward Vietnam and Cambodia and
how it contributed to the eventual Vietna;"ese
withdrawal and the progress toward a comprehensive settlement between the warring
Cambodian factions.

The Cambodian Conflict
The Cambodian conflict has dragged
on for decades and therefore has a large
~umber of significant events that have shaped
It over the years. It is a very complex conflict
with divers actors, as can be attested to by
the fact that at the 1991 Paris Conference
where the peace treaty was finally signed, the
four Cambodian factions were accompanied
by .1 ~ other countries who were integral
partIcIpants to the negotiations. To be able
to understand and analyze the conflict and the
Soviet Union's role in that conflict, a review
of the events and actors that shaped it will be
necessary.
During France's occupation of Indochina, students from all three colonies were
able to s~udy in France. In the early 1900s,
commUnism was the ideological fashion in
France, and the Indochinese students were
~utomatically attracted to this anti-imperialistic
Ideology. The most prominent of these
communist students was Nguyen Ai Quoc a
Vietnamese activist who later became kno~n
as Ho Chi Minh. During the 1920s Ho
" worked as a Communist bureaucrat' in
Moscow and elsewhere. Then, on February
3, 1930, he met with other Vietnamese

stude~ts and intellectuals in Hong Kong to
organIze the Indochina Communist Party
(ICP)" (Isaacs et al 1987, 18). The Soviet
supported ICP was active in Cambodia as well
but was mostly supported by Vietnames~
Cambodians. This was the beginning of Soviet
involvement in Cambodia.
1941 was a significant year in Cam~ia for two important events that took place.
FIrst, the French picked the next king of
Cambodia, and the 18-year-old Norodom
Sihanouk (the great-grandson of King Norodom) ascended the throne. Later that same
y~, France was invaded by Hitler's army.
WIth the French administration of Cambodia
in disarray, Japan invaded and occupied the
colony, but allowed the French administration
to continue operating. When the Japanese
surrendered in 1945, King Sihanouk declared
independence. However, when the Allied
occupation forces left Cambodia, they restored
control of the country back to the French.
The Cambodian people, and especially
Sihanouk, felt betrayed by the West.
In Vietnam, after Ho Chi Minh had
already declared independence, the country
was restored to French rule. When Ho had
d~l~~ independence, he made very strong
sollcltatlOns toward the US, but was disappointed when the US allowed France to resume
control of the country. The result was the
French-Indochina War which the French lost
~o Ho's Vietminh forces in a humiliating defeat
In 1953 at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. Both
China and the Soviet Union had supported the
Vietnamese in the war against the French.
The USSR provided some $365 million in aid
while Chinese aid totalled nearly $460 million.
However, it was probably because of China's
ext~n.sive aid that Vietnam began seeking
addltlOnal dependence on the Soviets:
The massive support that the Chinese provided
to the Vietnamese exacerbated the dilemma of
their relationship with China. The Vietnamese
Communists perceived that revolutionary debts
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can be weapons of exploitation in the hands of
the Chinese which made it necessary for them
to seek compensating support from the Soviet
Union" (Buszynski 1986, 151).

At the same time, King Sihanouk was leading
his "Royal Crusade for Independence" in
Cambodia. Through some shrewd political
manipulation, Sihanouk was able to eliminate
his opponents to become the prominent
nationalist leader and obtain the country's
independence from France.
Sihanouk and Communist Insure;ency

Sihanouk set up a neutral government
so as not to alienate either communist or
Western powers. The prime minister, Penh
Nouth stated in 1953: "Although we are not
communists, we do not oppose communism
as long as the latter is not to be imposed on
our people by force from outside" (Basu 1987,
15). In fact, Cambodia tried to maintain good
relations with both China and the Soviet Union
at the beginning of their disputes. However,
it was clear that China played a much more
significant role in Cambodia. It is during this
period, however, that communist insurgencies
began taking place in Cambodia--the Khmer
Rouge started their guerrilla activities against
the Sihanouk government.
At the time Cambodia gained its
independence, the Khmer Rouge made up only
a small rag-tag organization. They had been
supported by the Soviets and trained by the
Vietnamese. However, at the Geneva Conference on Indochina of 1954, the Soviets
provided for a withdrawal of Vietminh troops
from Cambodia. The Soviets generally
considered the Cambodian communists too
insignificant among the Indochinese communists (Basu, 1987, p. 15).
As the Vietminh withdrew back into
North Vietnam, most of the old-guard of the
Cambodian communist party went with them.
But the younger and more reactionary re-

mained to continue the insurgency. This
younger group, headed by Saloth Sar (later
known as Pol Pot), Ieng Sary, and Khieu
Samphan who had been fellow students in
France, formed a new party in 1960. As a
result of their disillusionment of Vietnam and
the Soviets, this reorganized Khmer Rouge
sought China's support, and when Sino-Soviet
relations disintegrated, the Khmer Rouge sided
with the Chinese. On the other hand, the
Soviets had always strongly supported Ho Chi
Minh, and so when the split occurred, Vietnam
naturally went to the Soviet side.
The Geneva Accords of 1954 divided
Vietnam into North and South, but required
elections the next year to reunite the country
under a democratically elected government.
However, the Diem regime in the South
refused to comply, and the US expressed its
support by funneling aid to the government.
As a result, the Vietminh set out on a crusade
to unite the country under communism by
force, and thus the Vietnam War began.
Before long, the Vietnam War spilled
over into Cambodia. As Vietminh transported
supplies to the Vietcong along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail through Cambodia, South Vietnamese troops (often accompanied by US troops)
began several incursions into Cambodian
territory. US bombing campaigns in Cambodia
were soon to follow. These bombings were
not confined to the jungles, but were carried
out in central population centers as well.
Moreover, US bombing campaigns in Cambodia exceeded the magnitude of the US bombings in Iraq.
The Cambodian people blamed Sihanouk for not being able to stop the bombings.
Subsequently, civilians in the country side
became more sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge,
and the communists were able to make some
very strategic advances. Sihanouk's cabinet
began to doubt his ability to resolve the crisis,
so on March 18, 1970, while Sihanouk was
on a diplomatic visit abroad, the defense
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minister, Lon Nol, staged a coup and deposed
the prince.
Sihanouk's main enemies during his
years in power were the communist insurgents.
Yet only a few days after the coup, Sihanouk
announced the formation of the United Front
with the Khmer Rouge to oppose the Lon Nol
regime. Considering Sihanouk's anti-communist past, it is difficult to understand why he
allied himself with the Khmer Rouge, his
former enemies. Betrayed by his own cabinet
and by the West, Sihanouk really had no one
else to tum to. All of these events forced him
closer to the Khmer Rouge who had immediately begun wooing the prince upon his being
ousted. Sihanouk later would join with the
Khmer Rouge again in 1982 in a coalition
government that would represent the r€:Sistance
to the Soviet-backed Heng Samrin regime.
For several more years, Soviet involvement in Cambodia would be limited until
the Vietnamese invasion in 1978. However,
several important events led up to the invasion,
but which exceed the scope of this study.
Following Sihanouk's ouster, the Lon Nol
regime controlled Cambodia from 1970 to
1975. That corrupt regime, however, was
displaced by the brutal Khmer Rouge which
controlled Cambodia up until the Vietnamese
invasion. Details of these two governments
will not be discussed in detail here because
the Soviet Union had little influence with either
regime.
The pro-US Lon Nol government--the
Republic of Cambodia (RC)--was quickly
recognized by the US, and a river of US aid
gushed into the country. The Khmer Rouge
immediately began a major offensive against
the Lon Nol government, starting a bloody,
five-year civil war that left millions of
Cambodians homeless. US bombings in
Cambodia continued until 1973 when the US
began to pull out of Indochina.
Khmer Rouge troops managed to
capture the countryside and beseige Phnom

Penh by early 1975. On April 17, the Lon
Nol government surrendered to the Khmer
Rouge. Once in power, the Khmer Rouge
established the government of Democratic
Kampuchea (DK). The Khmer Rouge instituted brutal Marxist agrarian reforms, and only
a few days after they captured Phnom Penh,
they emptied the city and forced its residents
into the countryside to work on state forcedlabor farms. The Party set out to purify
society from "corruption," especially religion
and Western institutions. Schools, libraries,
and ancient Buddhist temples were destroyed.
All forms of Western technology were
deplored and forbidden including televisions,
radios, trucks, and even farm tractors. All
were destroyed or abandoned. Power sources
and even water and sewage systems were
destroyed. Currency, markets, and financial
institutions were abolished and industries were
abandoned.
A program of autogenocide was
implemented aimed at the intellectual, merchant, and elite classes who were considered
unreformably corrupt. Even people who
simply wore glasses were murdered. Children
were stripped from their parents and sent to
work on youth farms where they were
indoctrinated and forced to hard labor. Over
one million people were killed by starvation,
disease, and mass execution. Large interrogation and torture centers were set up where
hundreds of thousands were systematically
murdered. During the Khmer Rouge days,
some 400,000 Cambodians fled to Vietnam
and Thailand. The magnitude of the slaughter
and devastation caused by the Khmer Rouge
is hard to comprehend.
Part of Pol Pot's plan to restore the
ancient Khmer glory was to reclaim its ancient
territory of the Mekhong delta in southern
Vietnam. Pol Pot called for the "liberation"
of southern Vietnam and heavy fighting on
the Vietnamese border began as Khmer Rouge
troops launched numerous cross-border raids.
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Over 500,000 Vietnamese were forced to leave
their homes because of the fighting (Mysliewiec 1988, xxi). In response to these
continued attacks over three years, and with
Soviet approval, Vietnam invaded Cambodia
and ousted the Democratic Kampuchea
government on December 25, 1978. The fact
that these border attacks took place, and
therefore, that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia
was provoked, is not well known. Throughout
the following years, the Soviet Union would
continue to profess the legitimacy of the
Phnom Penh regime and would engross itself
in massive aid to Vietnam and Cambodia.

The PRK and the CGDK
In January 1979, the Vietnamese, with
Soviet backing, established the communist
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with
Heng Samrin as president and Hun Sen as
foreign minister (who in 1987 became prime
minister). Heng Samrin and Hun Sen were,
as were many officials of the PRK, former
Khmer Rouge officials, but part of a faction
that remained loyal to Vietnam after the split.
Both had been regional officials in the DK,
but took part in an unsuccessful uprising
against the Pol Pot regime in 1978, before
defecting to Vietnam.
Later in 1979, a new guerrilla force
opposing the. PRK was formed: the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF),
headed by Son Sann, one of Sihanouk' s former
mInIsters.
Thailand supported the noncommunist force and armed its troops. In
another two years, in 1981, Prince Sihanouk
returned from China and united several small
pro-Sihanouk resistance factions into the
Sihanoukist National Anny (ANS) and founded
a political organization that would control the
army--the United National Front for an
Independent, Peaceful, and Cooperative
Cambodia (FUNCINPEC).

In 1982, with pressure from the US
and China, the two non-communist factions
joined with the Khmer Rouge in an uneasy
coalition in opposition to the PRK and
Vietnamese occupation forces. The coalition
was named the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) reflecting
the dominance of the Khmer Rouge which has
consistently had more than twice the number
of troops as the two non-communist factions
combined. Sihanouk became the president,
Khieu Samphan (Khmer Rouge) became the
vice-president, and Son Sann (KPNLF) became
the prime minister. Though all three factions
were under the presidency of Sihanouk, they
each retained their autonomous nature. The
coalition was given the DK's seatin the UN.
In 1985, a full-force Vietnamese
offensive overran all of the resistance bases
within Cambodia, and the CGDK forces along
with 250,000 civilians were forced across the
border into Thailand. Eight enclosed camps
were set up near the border within shelling
range of the Vietnamese army, each under
control of one of the CGDK factions. In
September, the Khmer Rouge announced the
retirement of Pol Pot in order to bolster
waning international support. Though it was
clear that Pol Pot still controlled the faction,
to their satisfaction they were able to get what
they wanted. Following the 1985 Vietnamese
offensive which nearly disabled the resistance,
the US Congress debated the issue, then
approved a substantial non-lethal aid package
to the CGDK.

The Beginnings of Refonn
For the Soviets, 1985 was a landmark
year with the arrival of Gorbachev to power
and the commencement of perestroika and
glasnost. Gorbachev began to reevaluate
Soviet policy in the Third World, especially
Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola.
The costs of maintaining sponsorship of these
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movements had severely drained Soviet coffers
and limited its political objectives in other
areas. Gorbachev set out to resolve these long
term conflicts with the anticipation that the
"withdrawal from Afghanistan in addition to
the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia
and Cuban withdrawal from Angola will pay
dividends throughout Southwest and Southeast
Asia, the Middle East and Africa" (Goodman
1991, 116). Gorbachev had a specific plan
for Cambodia which he felt would end the
conflict once and for all:
The type of settlement Moscow envisioned in
1985, however, was a non-aggression pact
between Indochina and ASEAN. The war in
Kampuchea [Cambodia) would then end because
ASEAN and other outside parties would cease
aiding the Cambodian opposition groups.
Vietnamese forces would withdraw from
Cambodia, but the Heng Samrin government
would remain in power. Moscow would not
even consider the possibility of its sharing power
(Katz 1989,51).

In 1986, Nguyen Van Linh became the
head of Vietnam's Communist Party and in
the spirit of Gorbachev's reforms began trying
to end Hanoi's international isolation, mainly
caused by the Cambodian conflict. In 1987,
Hun Sen, the PRK foreign minister, was
appointed to the post of prime minister. He
undertook some dramatic reforms of the
country, and before he had been in office a
year he had led the country in an abandonment
of Marxism and in a new pursuit of a market
economy. However, he maintained the single
party rule and close ties with Vietnam. In
April 1989, the PRK changed its name to the
State of Cambodia (SOC) reflecting its
abandonment of socialism. Hun Sen's reforms
have improved the country's conditions
immensely and have resulted in the SOC
gaining considerable legitimacy in the eyes
of the Cambodian people. Many nations such
as Australia began expressing to Hun Sen that
their governments would like to recognize the

SOC as soon as it complied with UN resolutions, namely, withdrawal of all foreign troops
and permitting UN-supervised elections.
Soviet efforts to persuade Hanoi and
Phnom Penh to undertake a withdrawal just
as the Soviets had done in Afghanistan did
not have much success until 1987 when Hun
Sen agreed to participate in talks with the
resistance. This move was highly praised by
Moscow as an adoption of a reconciliation
policy which Moscow approved heartily
(Duncan and Ekedahl 1990, 155). By this
time, Soviet policy had made a major compromise. In May 1987, at a dinner for Linh,
Gorbachev stated that the Cambodian problem:
can only be solved proceeding from the highest
interests of the Cambodian people and their
legitimate right to shape their destiny themselves,
on the basis of the unification ofall their natioflill
patrioticforces.(Katz 1989,51-52, italics added).

For the first time, the Soviets conceded to
allow power sharing among the four Cambodian factions as part of the settlement. This
is evidence that the Gorbachev leadership had
reduced its commitment in defending the proSoviet regime in Phnom Penh. II As in
Afghanistan, the cost to the Soviets of propping up the regime no longer appear[ed] worth
the effort" (Katz 1989, 52).
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
visited China in February 1989 and came to
a momentous decision. The Soviets agreed
that Vietnam would unilaterally withdraw its
troops from Cambodia with no conditions.
In April, Vietnam and Cambodia announced
that Vietnam would start immediately to
withdraw its troops and called for an end of
foreign military aid to all sides and for an
international control mechanism to supervise
withdrawal and the end to foreign aid (Duncan
and Ekedah11990, 156). This meeting came
as a precursor to the Paris Conference on
Cambodia which took place in July 1989.
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The objective of the Paris Conference
was to negotiate the formation of a coalition
government and to create an international
control mechanism that would verify troop
withdrawal and the end of weapon supplies
from outside sources and to monitor democratic elections. The Conference failed on several
issues, but mostly because China, the US, and
ASEAN demanded a comprehensive settlement
while Phnom Penh refused to include the
Khmer Rouge in an interim government. In
addition, Vietnam was nearly finished with
its withdrawal from Cambodia, and the resistance was anxious to see if it could attain a
military victory. One member of the Sihanouk
delegation summed up the conferences' failure
by stating:
We are deadlocked here because the military
situation is not decisive. If there is no result
on the battlefield, there is no result at the
negotiating table ... Hun Sen thinks he can still
win the war. That is why he has made no
concessions. When he is weak, he will negotiate
(United Nations Association 1991, 52).

In September 1989, Vietnam finished
withdrawing all of its troops from Cambodia,
leaving the 45,000 troop SOC army and a
poorly equipped militia behind to fend for itself
against the 70,000 resistance guerrillas. This
withdrawal was conducted unilaterally, without
UN-supervision as a UN resolution passed in
1988 required. The resolution required that
the withdrawal be done under UN supervision
and within the framework of a comprehensive
settlement. Once Vietnam completed its
withdrawal it requested a UN team to come
to Cambodia and verify that a complete
withdrawal had taken place. The UN refused
to do so unless it was within the framework
of a comprehensive settlement. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops has not been verified
to this day.
After the withdrawal, CaDK forces
experienced moderate success in a military

offensive against the SOc. Large chunks of
northwestern Cambodia came under resistance
control. However, most of the success was
achieved by the Khmer Rouge who began
forced repatriation of refugees into the newly
controlled areas:
From the murky claims and counterclaims, it
was difficult to pinpoint precisely what appreciable gains had been made by any of the four
factions by the end of the dry season in May
1990. Three conclusions seem valid: The Khmer
Rouge had given added proof of their superiority
on the battlefield, when they cared to demonstrate it, and were building up their political and
administrative infrastructure inside Cambodia;
the noncommunist groups seemed somewhat
better organized and more effective militarily
than in previous years but were tainted by their
association with the Khmer Rouge and had
limited capability to affect events on the ground;
and although the SOC armed forces had not
collapsed under the CGDK's military pressure,
they were nonetheless hard pressed to fend off
attacks from a variety of quarters. These were
some of the realities that had implications at the
negotiating table. (United Nations Association
1991, 54)

Development of a Comprehensive Political
Settlement
One of the first peace proposals for
the Cambodian conflict was presented in 1981
after the International Conference on Kampuchea. ASEAN proposed a comprehensive
settlement--ironically--very similar to the one
that was finally adopted ten years later. The
proposal involved UN-supervised disarmament
of all Khmer factions, Vietnamese withdrawal,
and free elections involving all four factions.
However, at that time, both China and the US
opposed any proposal that would include the
PRK in any power-sharing agreement or that
would in any way allow the Vietnameseinstalled government any legitimacy. The
Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the PRK also
rejected the plan because they opposed any
role for the Khmer Rouge. Since then, several
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proposals have been offered, but all have been
rejected mainly over this issue of powersharing. China and the US would not accept
a power-sharing role for the PRK; Vietnam
and the PRK would not accept a power-sharing
role for the Khmer Rouge; and Sihanouk,
China, and the US would not accept a settlement without a role for the Khmer Rouge.
The result has been a stalemate in which no
peace plan could succeed until there was a
substantial compromise.
The Australians drew up a detailed draft
proposal offering several configurations for
an enhanced UN role in a comprehensive
settlement. The Australian proposal recognized that the central challenge to a peace
settlement was the issue of power-sharing
between the factions until a new government
could be elected. Therefore, the Australian
proposal provided for the UN to create an
international control mechanism that would
involve a peacekeeping force and UN administration of the country until a newly elected
government could replace it. In the meantime,
no single Cambodian party would be able to
determine the country's destiny. It provided
for important issues such as how to implement
a cease-fire, how to run free elections, and
how to ensure a politically neutral administration in the transition period. Shortly after
Evans announced the Australian proposals,
the five permanent members of the Security
Council adopted the issue onto their agenda.
On January 15-16, 1990, the five
permanent members of the Security Council,
including the Soviets, met in Paris to examine
the Australian proposals and write up a plan
based on its suggestions. The permanent five
draft included the formation of a Supreme
National Council (SNC), a quadripartite body
made up of representatives from each of the
four factions. The SNC would be the repository of Cambodian sovereignty, hold the seat
at the UN, and function in a delegative

capacity to the transitional authority. However, this draft plan did not specify the scope
of UN involvement in the administration of
the government.
In a communique issued by the
permanent five at their January 1990 meeting,
they stated that "all Cambodians should enjoy
the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities
to participate in the election process" (United
Nations Association 1991, 56). This statement
and the exclusion of the usual pledge regarding
a "non-return to the universally condemned
policies and practices of the recent past"
indicate that the Khmer Rouge were given full
license to participate in the proposed elections.
This may have been a "realistic acceptance
that the Khmer Rouge must be allowed to
compete in elections so that their (presumed)
defeat would allow China a graceful exit"
(United Nations Association 1991, 56).
At first, Vietnam and the Hun Sen
regime strongly opposed any such UN
intervention that would violate its sovereignty
and disregard its claimed legitimacy. However, the Soviet Union was their main source
of subsistence, and the Soviets had fully
participated in drawing up the UN plan. The
Soviets obviously became concerned that the
Hun Sen government would not agree to a
settlement that the Soviets had a hand in
writing (Vinogradov 1990). With continued
pressure from the Soviets, the Hun Sen
government yielded and agreed in principle
to the UN plan.
The five permanent members of the
Security Council met again in March 1990
and outlined the scope of involvement which
the UN was willing to take. This proposed
international control mechanism was to be
called the UN Transitional Authority of
Cambodia (UNT AC). It proposed that the
SNC would delegate to UNT AC all necessary
powers to administer the government, but
would be consulted by and give advice to
UNTAC. UNTAC would be headed by a
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special representative of the Secretary-General
who would be given considerable powers over
Cambodian territory in order to protect the
Cambodian people from economic and social
discrimination and protect their fundamental
rights.
Japan invited the Cambodian factions
to Tokyo on June 5, 1990 in order to decide
on important issues of the settlement, particularly the makeup of the SNC. Despite a
Khmer Rouge boycott in protest over a
diplomatic formality it did not approve of, the
remaining parties were able to come to a
decision on the SNC. It was agreed that the
council would be made up of 12 representatives, six from the SOC and six from the three
resistance forces (two each).
In July 1990, US Secretary of State
James Baker announced a major policy
reversal. Due to increased pressure at home,
a realization that the Khmer Rouge could
possibly return to power, and the increased
legitimacy of the Hun Sen government, the
US retracted its recognition of the resistance
coalition and opened talks with the SOC and
Vietnam. Though this surprising reversal of
US policy was popular in the US and other
Western countries, it outraged the ASEAN
nations who accused the US of trying to pull
the rug out from under its friends. On August
6, the US held its first talks with Vietnam on
Cambodia, and then in September 6 with the
SOC.
Through continued and difficult
negotiations, the Cambodian factions finally
came to an agreement on the UN plan. Then
on September 20, 1991, the Security Council
adopted resolution 668 showing unanimity and
support for the proposed expanded role of the
UN in Cambodia. General Assembly resolution 45/3, adopted on October 15, 1990,
showed the full support of the Assembly for
Security Council resolution 668.
During 1991, several events took place
making significant progress towards the signing

of the peace agreement. A cease-fire finally
was implemented between the factions in May,
but both sides accused each other of violations.
In a meeting in June, all members of the SNC
agreed to an indefinite cease-fire and to stop
accepting foreign arms. In July, Sihanouk
resigned from his post as head of FUNCINPEC to become the neutral leader of the
SNC. A significant decision was reached by
the SNC in August in which it was decided
to disband only 70% of current military forces
and put the remainder under UN control. In
September, the SNC resumed meetings in New
York where its members agreed to a compromise system of elections providing for
proportional representation that would allow
each faction places in the Parliament based
on its share of the popular vote. Finally, on
October 23, 1991, the Paris Conference on
Cambodia was reconvened and the UN peace
plan was signed by all four Cambodian parties
and 18 other involved nations ending more
than 20 years of civil war.

Soviet Incentives for Concession
Examining the events and the involvement of the Soviets in the Cambodian
crisis, a major shift of policy has been
identified where the Soviets began exerting
pressure on Vietnam and Phnom Penh to settle
the dispute. Most significant has been the
Soviet's position as a permanent member of
the UN Security Council and as a co-writer
of the UN peace plan. Though Phnom Penh
fervently resisted at first, it has conceded to
Soviet pressures and has accepted the settlement. A closer look at why the Soviets have
made this policy change is warranted.
According to Kolodziej and Kanet there
are five main constraints to Soviet expansion
in the Third World:
1.

Developing countries have an increasing ability to resist subordination and
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2.

3.

4.

5.

to manipulate the Soviets for their own
advantage.
The Soviets have been checked by the
economic and military power of the
US and its Western allies.
Divisions within the socialist camp-notably the Sino-Soviet split.
Receding relevance of the Soviet model
to many Third World countries.
Scarce economic and technological
resources commanded by Moscow to
project its power and purposes abroad
(1989, xiii-xiv).

Developing countries have increased
their ability to resist subordination, not only
to the Soviets, but any country that might pose
a threat. Small Third World countries have
taken a very aggressive posture in international
organizations, particularly the UN. Through
bloc voting, the Third World has been able
to bring about several programs such as the
UNO P that directly favor their particular needs
and often conflict with the interests of the Big
Powers. Not only have they been able to
protect themselves from subordination, but
they have been able to attain many objectives
at the expense of the industrialized countries
(Bennett 1991, 291). In the case of Southeast
Asia, Vietnam has been able to take considerable advantage of the Soviet Union. Vietnam's
isolation from the rest of the world made it
so that it could only trade with the CMEA
countries. Its trade with the Soviets was highly
imbalanced and the Soviets gained little more
than an ideological victory in the aftermath
of the US-Vietnam War.
Though the Soviets have been able to
move into Vietnam after the US pulled out,
the US military presence in nearby Philippines
and elsewhere remained a continual threat to
Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. The
economic power of the US and its allies has
been a considerable constraint on Soviet
expansion in the region. The isolation of
Cambodia and Vietnam by Western and
ASEAN countries has impoverished Indochi-

nese economies which have stagnated and
lacked significant development.
As was discussed above, the division
between Soviet and Chinese communists caused
a multitude of problems for the Soviets in
Indochina. Its current dilemma in Cambodia
is a product of that conflict with the Khmer
Rouge in the Chinese camp, and the PRK in
the Soviet camp. However, since 1989,
relations between the Soviets and China have
warmed considerably. Their joint agreement
in Beijing that Vietnam would withdraw from
Cambodia and that all foreign military support
to the Cambodian factions should end was a
landmark decision. The fact that the Soviet's
made most of the concessions is an indication
that the Gorbachev government is anxious to
wrap up this drawn out conflict and move on
to more productive pursuits.
The Third World perceives the Soviet
Union as ideologically bankrupt. MarxismLeninism is not widely perceived to apply to
the conditions of developing countries today.
In addition, the economic problems that the
Soviet Union is facing at home has made it
a non-model of economic development that
is encouraging Third World countries to look
for other models, mostly that of the US and
the NICs. The rapid economic development
that occurred in the Soviet Union in its happier
days has all but ceased. Its inability to adjust
to the needs and impulses of the day has
plowed its economic system into the ground.
This, obviously, is what the developing nations
are trying to avoid, not replicate.
Probably most significant of all these
issues is that scarce economic and technological resources have become more scarce
than ever in recent years and have eventually
concl uded in the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Faced with this economic turmoil which has
impacted even Moscow, the Soviets can no
longer afford the expansive aid commitments
to developing countries. In fact, this has been
a rising concern of the Soviets for some time
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and a major reevaluation of Soviet aid commitments and pTactices have been undertaken.
On June 13, 1990, the Supreme Soviet adopted
a resolution instructing the Council of Ministers "to work on cutting back the amount of
aid we give" (Arefyeva 1990). Arefyeva, a
columnist for Izvestia, summarized the debate
concerning the Supreme Soviet's resolution
by stating:
I'd like to congratulate the Deputies on an
important step toward glasnost ... At the same
time, however, one can only regret the fact that
the question had been posed so narrowly and
deals only with the volume of aid. For the
problem is not one of volume ... The essence of
the problem lies elsewhere-namely, in the thrust
and objectives of our aid ... We should be talking
about a full review of our aid policy, which
would in turn lead to a reduction. At any rate,
provided we base our reasoning not on ideology,
as in the past, but on humanitarian considerations
and sober economic calculation (Arefyeva 1990).

This was followed by a decree from Gorbachev
on July 24, 1990:
In implementing measures to further expand
economic cooperation with developing countries,
it is to base this cooperation on the principles
of mutual benefit and mutual interest, guided
by international norms and practice. It is to
proceed from the premise that economic aid must
be provided with due regard for our country's
real capabilities (Gorbachev 1990).

When the head of the socialist countries
department of the USSR Council of Ministers'
State Foreign Economic Council, V. Demchuk,
was asked about Gorbachev's decree, he
responded by saying that the main countries
in concern were Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam. "Take Vietnam, for example," he said.
"One can cite a good many costly projects that
were taken on without proper consideration,
resulting in the squandering of a lot of money"
(Romanyuk 1990). Vietnam possibly represen ts the largest aid package the Soviets offer.
It is estimated that Vietnam receives over $1.2

billion per year, a large portion of which goes
to their military (Duncan and Ekedahl 1990,
154).
With the recent breakup of the Soviet
Union, continued aid to Vietnam and Cambodia is clearly at risk. However, in the years
leading up to the union's collapse, it would
not have seemed likely for the Soviets to
consider abandoning Indochina. Even so, it
was obvious that the Soviets were anxious to
reduce Indochina's dependency upon Soviet
resources, and tried to do so by three methods.
First, the Soviets tried to encourage more
efficient use of its aid and prompted Vietnam
and Cambodia to pursue market economies.
Second, in order to reduce Vietnam and
Cambodia's dependency, the Soviets have tried
to facilitate the integration of Indochina into
the booming economic structure of the ASEAN
nations and make them eligible for internationalloans. And third, in an attempt to improve
their image in the region, the Soviets have
reduced their military presence in Southeast
Asia with a huge reduction of troops and navy
at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.
Previous to Gorbachev, the Soviets
underwrote the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia. Soviet-bloc aid provided the
Phnom Penh regime with more than threefourths of its budget. Recently, the Soviets
began cutting aid to Cambodia: "The USSR
and Eastern European states are cutting
economic aid to Cambodia and introducing
'pay-as-you-go' exchanges and loans payable
in hard currency" (Goodman 1991, 180). This
changing-the-rules-of-the-game will make a
serious impact on Cambodia. Though Hun
Sen had originally rejected the UN peace
settlement, the plan provided for a commitment
of some 22 nations to aid Cambodia in its
reconstruction efforts--a very attractive offer
considering the fact that the Soviets could no
longer be counted on. With the breakup of
the Soviet Union after the attempted coup in
August 1991, the SOC realized that a perma-
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nent cessation of Soviet aid was imminent and
it would have to make major concessions and
accept the UN plan which offered its only hope
of survival.
Other factors responsible for the
Soviet's eagerness for Vietnam and Phnom
Penh to resolve the conflict through the UN
plan are: 1) the Soviets could not foresee any
military solution to the problem, 2) US-Sino
relations were strengthened against the Soviet
Union largely because of the Cambodian
conflict, and 3) the conflict prohibited rapprochement with ASEAN which Moscow saw
as crucial for both the Soviet Union and for
Indochina's integration into the regional and
global economy.
Considering the Soviet Union's wider
international objectives and its current economic vulnerability, Moscow knew it would
have to depend on international support. This
put military intervention of any sort out of the
question. The hope of SOC troops obtaining
a military victory on their own was not
realistic after the fighting in 1990 ended in
stalemate that slightly favored the resistance.
The only alternative was a peaceful settlement.
Poor SimrSoviet relations had for years
hindered Soviet objectives in Asia, especially
when the US joined with China on the
Cambodian issue. For the last two decades ,
no Asian country would want to increase
Soviet presence for fear of antagonizing the
Chinese. [n 1989, Gorbachev made some
strong overtures to China by unilaterally
meeting three of Beijing's conditions for
reconciliation: withdrawal from Afghanistan,
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and
unilateral Soviet troop reductions on the SinoSoviet border (Goodman 1991, 110).
In 1987, Gorbachev sent a strong
message to ASEAN nations that it was
committed to rapprochement. For the first
time ever, a Soviet Foreign Minister (Shevardnadze) visited Thailand and Indonesia. The
visits were for the purpose of finding a solution

to the Cambodian crisis, which was used as
the campaign for rapprochement. Soviet
objectives with the ASEAN states has been
to:
enhance its political image, increase its economic
participation in the region's rapid growth,
facilitate the political and economic integration
of the communist countries of the region into
regional affairs (in order to reduce their reliance
on Moscow's largesse), and improve the environment for its own strategic objectives (Duncan
and Ekedahl 1990, 157).

With a resolution to the Cambodian conflict,
the Soviets would be able to pursue these
objectives. Especially now with the breakup
of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis
they are facing, the Soviets more than ever
will need the support of ASEAN, the US,
China, as well as the rest of the international
community. Thus, the Soviets have continued
to encourage and provide incentives for Hanoi
and Phnom Penh to submit to the provisions
of the UN peace plan.
Conclusion
For years, the Cambodian conflict has
been a complex skein of contradicting interests
and violent confrontation. The Soviet Union
stood opposed by the US and China who each
supported different Cambodian contingents
in this very "international" civil war. But
since 1985, significant moves were made by
Hanoi and Phnom Penh which allowed for a
comprehensive settlement to take place. First,
Vietnam withdrew all its troops in 1989. Then
in 1991, Phnom Penh agreed to sign an unprecedented peace treaty ending the two
decades of violence.
Most of the analyses focusing on the
recent developments of the Cambodian
settlement have centered attention on the policy
implemented by the US and China and its
impact on the decisions of Vietnam and
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Cambodia. However, they have neglected the
fact that the Soviet Union, since 1985, has
played a major role in influencing those
decisions. The Soviets encouraged a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, reduced their
aid to both countries, and undertook a campaign to integrate them into the region
politically and economically.
The central incentive for the Soviets
to encourage a speedy settlement was its
economic concerns. The devastating economic
decline in the Soviet Union made it incapable
of attending to its former Third World commitments. The Soviets closely reexamined their
development aid programs and instituted some
sweeping reforms. Vietnam and Cambodia,
who depended mostly on the Soviet Union for
their survival, realized that their economic aid
was in jeopardy and that they must end their

international isolation in order to avoid
disaster. When the attempted coup in the
Soviet Union resulted in its breakup, Phnom
Penh realized its aid would be ceased and it
would have to depend on the wider world for
its survival. Thus, it would have to come to
terms with the UN comprehensive settlement.
On October 23, 1991, Phnom Penh
and the Cambodian resistance factions signed
the peace treaty and initiated the huge UN
operation that will dismantle the Hun Sen
government and operate the country's key
ministries until a new coalition government
is elected through UN-supervised elections.
Several challenges to the UN operation still
lie ahead, but with unanimity in the UN
Security Council, chances are greatly improved
that the operation will be successful and that
peace will finally be restored to the war-torn
country.
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